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ESTIMATING THE PREVALENCE 
 OF ENTRAPMENT  
IN POST-9/11 TERRORISM CASES 
JESSE J. NORRIS* & 
HANNA GROL-PROKOPCZYK** 
[T]he essence of what occurred here is that a government . . . came upon a man both 
bigoted and suggestible, one who was incapable of committing an act of terrorism on 
his own, created acts of terrorism out of his fantasies of bravado and bigotry, and made 
those fantasies come true. . . . [R]eal terrorists would not have bothered themselves with 
a person who was so utterly inept. . . . [O]nly the government could have made a terrorist 
out of Mr. Cromitie, a man whose buffoonery is positively Shakespearian in its scope. 
U.S. District Court Judge Colleen McMahon, United States v. Cromitie1  
Prior to September 11, 2001, if an agent had suggested opening a terrorism case against 
someone who was not a member of a terrorist group, who had not attempted to acquire 
weapons, and who didn’t have the means to obtain them, he would have been gently 
encouraged to look for a more serious threat. An agent who suggested giving such a 
person a stinger missile or a car full of military-grade plastic explosives would have 
been sent to counseling. Yet . . . such techniques are now becoming commonplace. 
Michael German, former FBI agent2  
Hamid [Hayat] is a hapless character, but, my God, he isn’t a terrorist. The government 
counted on hysteria, the 1,000-pound gorilla, to be in the room. And it worked.  
James J. Wedick, thirty-five-year veteran of the FBI3 
 
* Ph.D., J.D. Assistant Professor of Criminal Justice, State University of New York at 
Fredonia. The authors wish to thank Errol Meidinger, Guyora Binder, Or Bassok, Kaja Tretjak, 
Anna Su, James Gardner, Anthony O’Rourke, Michael Halberstam, and Anya Bernstein for 
their helpful comments on previous drafts of this Article.  
** Ph.D. Assistant Professor of Sociology, University at Buffalo, State University of New 
York. 
1 Joshua L. Dratel, The Literal Third Way in Approaching “Material Support for 
Terrorism”: Whatever Happened to 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(C) and the Civil Injunctive Option?, 
57 WAYNE L. REV. 11, 76 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
2 Michael German, Manufacturing Terrorists: How FBI Sting Operations Make Jihadists 
out of Hapless Malcontents, REASON, Apr. 2013, at 54, 55. 
3 Mark Arax, The Agent Who Might Have Saved Hamid Hayat, L.A. TIMES, May 28, 2006, 
at 42. 
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How many of the terrorism convictions since September 11, 2001 have 
been the product of entrapment? Some scholars and journalists have 
suggested that the number is quite high. One report went so far as to claim 
that only 1% of terrorism prosecutions involve “real” terrorism. The 
government’s defenders, at the opposite extreme, come close to saying that 
entrapment in a terrorism case is a contradiction in terms. 
Little empirical basis exists for evaluating these competing claims. 
Existing literature on terrorism and entrapment is typically based on detailed 
discussions of a few egregious cases, rather than systematic analysis of the 
phenomenon. Yet estimating the prevalence of entrapment is critical for 
evaluating the ethics and effectiveness of contemporary counterterrorism 
policies. 
This Article remedies this dearth of information by creating and 
analyzing a database of terrorism prosecutions since 9/11 (n=580), and 
coding each of the cases involving an informant (n=317) for twenty 
indicators of potential entrapment. An analysis of the database reveals that 
entrapment indicators are widespread among terrorism cases, and that the 
most serious cases, involving specific plots to commit attacks, have 
significantly more indicators. Cases with several indicators account for a 
sizable proportion of all cases, especially among alleged cases of jihadi and 
left-wing terrorism. These results show that facts and allegations supporting 
an entrapment defense are not confined to a small number of cases, but rather 
are quite widespread in post-9/11 terrorism cases. 
The Article also examines the suggestion by a journalist that only 1% of 
terrorism cases have represented a real security threat. It estimates that the 
proportion of terrorism prosecutions likely to have thwarted genuine 
terrorism threats is somewhat higher, though still small—about 9% of all 
jihadi cases and 5% of jihadi cases involving informants. 
In light of these findings, the Article recommends that authorities 
rethink current counterterrorism strategies, concentrating on passive 
surveillance instead of attempts to coax law-abiding Muslims into terrorist 
schemes, and shifting more resources toward preventing right-wing 
terrorism. Finally, the Article proposes reforms that would require the 
government to have a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity before 
inducing a suspect into committing a crime, and that would base the 
entrapment defense on the defendant’s realistic likelihood of committing an 
offense without government prompting. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Entrapment allegations abound in contemporary terrorism cases.4 Even 
in cases in which the defendants themselves do not raise the entrapment 
defense, legal scholars, journalists, and defense attorneys often argue that 
government informants are tempting defendants into crimes that would never 
otherwise have been committed.5 Frequently, the claim is not only that the 
defendant, without an informant’s involvement, would never have committed 
this particular crime, but also that the defendant would never have committed 
any terrorist offense.6 
This critique appears to have merit, at least with respect to the most 
egregious cases. The case of James Cromitie, who was prosecuted for 
plotting to bomb synagogues and shoot down military planes, is a prime 
example. U.S. District Court Judge Colleen McMahon, in the quote 
introducing this Article, made clear that she believed Cromitie to have had 
no ability to carry out any terrorist act whatsoever.7 As Judge McMahon 
wrote in another order, Cromitie “would not have had the slightest idea how 
to make [a terrorist attack] happen.”8 At sentencing, she emphatically stated, 
“I believe beyond a shadow of a doubt that there would have been no crime 
here except the government instigated it, planned it, and brought it to 
fruition.”9 
Despite these statements, however, Judge McMahon refused to rule that 
Cromitie was entrapped as a matter of law, and she sentenced him to twenty-
five years in prison.10 The Second Circuit upheld her decision, though only 
over the vigorous dissent of Chief Judge Dennis Jacobs.11 More broadly, 
despite attempts to raise the entrapment defense (and the related outrageous 
 
4 See, e.g., Eric Schmitt & Charlie Savage, In U.S. Sting Operations, Questions of 
Entrapment, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2010, at A23. 
5 Sahar F. Aziz, Caught in a Preventive Dragnet: Selective Counterterrorism in a Post-
9/11 America, 47 GONZ. L. REV. 429, 446–48 (2012); Sabrina Rubin Erdely, The Plot Against 
Occupy: How the Government Turned Five Stoner Misfits into the World’s Most Hapless 
Terrorist Cell, ROLLING STONE, Sept. 13, 2012, at 68; Rick Perlstein, How FBI Entrapment Is 
Inventing ‘Terrorists’—and Letting Bad Guys Off the Hook, ROLLING STONE (May 15, 2012), 
http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/how-fbi-entrapment-is-inventing-terrorists-and-
letting-bad-guys-off-the-hook-20120515.  
6 Dratel, supra note 1, at 75–76; German, supra note 2; Erdely, supra note 5, at 75. 
7 See Dratel, supra note 1, at 76. 
8 United States v. Cromitie, No. 09 CR. 558 (CM), 2011 WL 1842219, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. 
May 10, 2011), aff’d, 727 F.3d 194 (2d Cir. 2013). 
9 United States v. Cromitie, 727 F.3d 194, 210 (2d Cir. 2013) (internal quotations omitted) 
(citing sentencing transcript). 
10 Cromitie, 2011 WL 1842219, at *15–16; Cromitie, 727 F.3d at 227. 
11 Cromitie, 727 F.3d at 227–30 (Jacobs, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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government conduct defense) by several defendants in post-9/11 terrorism 
cases, not a single one has been successful.12 The failure of these doctrines 
may result not from weaknesses in the defendants’ cases, but rather from 
various other factors, including shortcomings in the doctrines themselves.13 
Due to uncertainty about the entrapment defense’s applicability to 
particular cases, this Article sometimes refers to “entrapment or borderline 
entrapment.” We use the term “borderline entrapment” to signify a case in 
which entrapment is arguable, because the defendant would probably not 
have engaged in terrorism without government encouragement, but which 
may fall short of the legal standards operative in the particular jurisdiction. 
For example, even though Cromitie would have never committed an act 
of terror on his own and had to be offered extraordinary inducements before 
he finally agreed to participate, the courts did not recognize this as 
entrapment.14 Normatively, such cases should be just as problematic as cases 
in which the entrapment doctrines unquestionably apply, because they 
indicate that the government has prosecuted, to use Judge Richard Posner’s 
language, an “objectively harmless” person.15 This violates the policy 
concerns underlying the entrapment defense, which courts developed to 
prevent the “manufacturing of crime.”16 
Although some legal scholars have noted the apparent presence of 
entrapment in contemporary terrorism prosecutions, their work has not yet 
clarified the full extent of entrapment, or borderline entrapment, in these 
 
12 Francesca Laguardia, Terrorists, Informants, and Buffoons: The Case for Downward 
Departure as a Response to Entrapment, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 171 (2013) (noting the 
universal failure of the entrapment defense in terrorism cases); Richard Bernstein, A Defense 
That Could Be Obsolete, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Dec. 1, 2010, at 2 (noting the fact that no 
terrorism defendants have been acquitted on entrapment grounds since 9/11). 
13 See infra subpart II.A. 
14 See Cromitie, 727 F.3d at 215; Dratel, supra note 1, at 66–67, 76.  
15 United States v. Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d 1196, 1202 (7th Cir. 1994). 
16 As the U.S. Supreme Court said in Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 372 (1958): 
 In Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, this Court firmly recognized the defense of 
entrapment in the federal courts. The intervening years have in no way detracted from the 
principles underlying that decision. The function of law enforcement is the prevention of crime 
and the apprehension of criminals. Manifestly, that function does not include the manufacturing 
of crime. Criminal activity is such that stealth and strategy are necessary weapons in the arsenal 
of the police officer. However, ‘A different question is presented when the criminal design 
originates with the officials of the Government, and they implant in the mind of an innocent person 
the disposition to commit the alleged offense and induce its commission in order that they may 
prosecute.’ 287 U.S. at 442. Then stealth and strategy become as objectionable police methods as 
the coerced confession and the unlawful search. Congress could not have intended that its statutes 
were to be enforced by tempting innocent persons into violations. 
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cases.17 Instead, their articles tend to limit themselves to narrative 
descriptions of the most problematic cases. The same is true for nonacademic 
publications, such as those by the Center for Human Rights and Global 
Justice at New York University Law School.18 Even the first full-length book 
on terrorism and entrapment, The Terror Factory: Inside the FBI’s 
Manufactured War on Terror by Trevor Aaronson, discusses a fairly small 
number of cases, though more than most sources.19 
Despite this, many observers seem to believe that entrapment is 
widespread in terrorism cases, and one critic goes so far as to claim that only 
1% of terrorism prosecutions represent “real” threats.20 At the other end of 
the spectrum, some see the government’s approach as a rational, defensible 
strategy, and suggest that entrapment is virtually impossible in terrorism 
cases.21 This Article takes a solid first step toward evaluating these competing 
claims, and estimating entrapment’s true prevalence. 
This Article analyzes all post-9/11 terrorism prosecutions, in order to 
identify any cases presenting plausible entrapment claims.22 This enables a 
more nuanced and thorough assessment of entrapment in terrorism cases, 
useful for analyzing both individual cases and the government’s prosecutorial 
practices as a whole. 
To estimate the scale of potential entrapment or outrageous government 
conduct, this Article presents two databases developed by the authors. The 
first database, encompassing all post-9/11 terrorism prosecutions in U.S. 
courts, improves on previous databases by excluding cases with only 
speculative links to terrorism, while including those motivated by right-wing 
 
17 Wadie E. Said, The Terrorist Informant, 85 WASH. L. REV. 687, 715–32 (2010) 
(covering eight cases); Jon Sherman, “A Person Otherwise Innocent”: Policing Entrapment 
in Preventative, Undercover Counterterrorism Investigations, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1475, 
1489–99 (2009) (discussing four cases).  
18 CTR. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS & GLOBAL JUST., NYU L. SCHOOL, TARGETED AND ENTRAPPED 
(2011).  
19 TREVOR AARONSON, THE TERROR FACTORY: INSIDE THE FBI’S MANUFACTURED WAR ON 
TERRORISM (2013). By our count, the book discusses sixteen cases of potential entrapment in 
terrorism prosecutions.  
20 Joshua Holland, Only 1 Percent of “Terrorists” Caught by the FBI Are Real, SALON 
(July 10, 2013, 1:30 PM), http://www.salon.com/2013/07/10/only_1_percent_of_terrorists_
caught_by_fbi_are_real_partner/. 
21 Dru Stevenson, Entrapment and Terrorism, 49 B.C. L. REV. 125, 142–44 (2008); L. 
Gordon Crovitz, Stopping ‘Predisposed’ Terrorists: Is Giving a Fake Bomb to an Eager, 
Aspiring Jihadist Entrapment?, WALL ST. J., Oct. 29, 2012, at A12.  
22 More specifically, the database includes all terrorism prosecutions in the U.S. court 
system between September 11, 2001 and September 11, 2014, as long as the offense occurred 
after September 11, 2001.  
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or left-wing ideology.23 It should be noted that, although “terrorism” is a 
contested term subject to manipulation for political purposes, the Article 
employs it for the sake of convenience based on the reality of the 
government’s use of the word to describe a wide variety of ideologically 
motivated crimes.24 Accordingly, this Article uses a broad definition of 
terrorism, applying the term to any serious violent or property crime 
committed to advance a particular ideology (such as, for example, jihadi, left-
wing, or right-wing ideology).25 
The second, smaller database is composed only of those cases involving 
an informant or undercover agent before the crime was committed. To 
estimate the strength of a potential entrapment or outrageous government 
conduct defense in each case, the Article develops twenty indicators of 
entrapment or outrageous government conduct, based on the relevant case 
law and recurrent features from examples of alleged entrapment in terrorism 
cases. Drawing on court documents and various other sources, we evaluated 
the cases in the second database to determine whether each of the twenty 
indicators was present. 
The results suggest that entrapment (or borderline entrapment) is quite 
prevalent within terrorism prosecutions and that the case for entrapment is 
 
23 The Article speaks of cases or prosecutions rather than convictions, because it includes 
pending cases as well. 
24 For example, observers have questioned whether particular acts, such as ecologically 
motivated attacks on property, are labeled as terrorism for political reasons, even though such 
attacks have never resulted in any fatalities. See Jared S. Goodman, Shielding Corporate 
Interests from Public Dissent: An Examination of the Undesirability and Unconstitutionality 
of “Eco-Terrorism” Legislation, 16 J.L. & POL’Y 823, 835 (2008). More generally, critics 
have often drawn attention to the politicized manner in which particular groups are defined, 
or not defined, as terrorists. AARONSON, supra note 19, at 236; Tung Yin, Were Timothy 
McVeigh and the Unabomber the Only White Terrorists?: Race, Religion, and the Perception 
of Terrorism, 4 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 33 (2013) (arguing that non-Muslims who commit 
violent crimes are much less likely to be referred to as terrorists than are Muslims); see also 
Mark Brown, Slingshots, Boasts and Booze Don’t Add Up to Terrorism, CHI. SUN TIMES, Jan. 
22, 2014, at 14 (arguing that, in the NATO 3 case, authorities may have sought out activists to 
label as terrorists in order to chill protesters’ freedom of speech). See generally WILL POTTER, 
GREEN IS THE NEW RED (2011) (documenting and critically analyzing the depiction of animal-
rights activists and environmentalists as terrorists). 
25 This definition is somewhat broader than some government definitions, which require a 
motivation to coerce or intimidate the government or the civilian population. We did not 
incorporate such a motivation into our definition because it would appear to be superfluous. 
In that respect, our definition is similar to that used by the Australian government. RICHARD 
JACKSON ET AL., TERRORISM 102 (2011) (presenting various government definitions of 
terrorism). Only serious crimes are included, since unlike serious crimes such as murder and 
arson, low-level offenses such as vandalism and assault are not generally perceived as 
terrorism. 
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especially strong among the most serious cases, in which defendants were 
accused of plotting a specific terrorist attack. Cases with numerous indicators 
comprise a significant percentage of all informant cases, particularly in jihadi 
and left-wing cases.26 While the most well-known cases of possible 
entrapment average more indicators than other cases, they do not represent 
the majority of the high-scoring cases. These results demonstrate that facts 
or allegations supporting an entrapment or outrageous government conduct 
defense are not present only in a small handful of cases, but instead are widely 
distributed. 
Critics of the government appear to be correct that only a small 
percentage of terrorism prosecutions involve a serious threat to public safety. 
However, our estimate of the percentage of cases representing a genuine 
threat of a terrorist attack (about 9% of the cases) is somewhat larger than 
that of the most extreme critics. The majority of the terrorism prosecutions 
since 9/11 appear to involve crimes with a relatively attenuated link to 
domestic public safety (such as donations to foreign terrorist groups or 
attempts to join them overseas), with a significant minority consisting of plots 
in which the informant played such a leading role that it is unlikely that the 
plot (or any other terrorist offense) would have arisen without government 
involvement. 
To supplement these results, a brief analysis of a recently published list 
of the top sixty terror attacks and thwarted plots reveals that cases with 
numerous indicators of entrapment constitute a large proportion of these 
cases.27 This suggests that many of the most widely known and serious cases, 
touted as successes in the War on Terror, have plausible entrapment claims. 
In light of this Article’s analysis, and recent research demonstrating that 
right-wing terrorists are responsible for more violence than jihadis, the 
government should rethink its focus on targeting law-abiding Muslims for 
inducement. Instead, the government should shift its resources toward 
passive surveillance and, at least to some degree, toward the threat of right-
wing terrorism. The Article also argues for a requirement that authorities 
have reasonable suspicion of criminal activity before inducing defendants 
into crimes, and for a reformed entrapment defense focused on the 
defendant’s likelihood of committing a similar offense without government 
influence. 
 
26 See infra Part IV. The term “jihadi” is used, even though it misleadingly implies that 
the Islamic concept of jihad is inherently violent, because of both the lack of better alternatives 
and the fact that terrorists themselves use the term. See Parvez Ahmed, Terror in the Name of 
Islam—Unholy War, Not Jihad, 39 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 759, 783 (2008). “Islamist” could 
be used instead, but this would incorrectly imply that moderate Islamists support violence. Id. 
27 See infra Part V.C. 
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Part I of this Article provides background on the relevant legal 
standards, post-9/11 administrative developments, and previous analyses of 
entrapment in terrorism cases. Part II clarifies the nature of the indicators 
developed for this Article, and describes the twenty entrapment indicators. 
Part III details the methodology used to create the databases. Part IV presents 
the results of an analysis of both the larger database and of the smaller 
database of cases involving informants or undercover agents. Part V reflects 
on the significance of this Article’s findings, responds to the claim that only 
1% of the terrorism cases represented a genuine threat, and discusses 
potential administrative and doctrinal reforms that could reduce entrapment 
abuses. The final section includes a brief conclusion and offers suggestions 
for future research. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. THE FBI’S CHANGE IN STRATEGY 
Prior to September 11, 2001, terrorism was not a particularly high 
priority for the American government in general, or for the FBI in 
particular.28 9/11, of course, changed everything. Large swaths of the state 
apparatus were reorganized to better combat terrorism.29 Much of the FBI’s 
funding shifted to terrorism-related matters, resulting in sharp reductions in 
the resources and staff devoted to white-collar and organized crime.30 
Since the FBI had been blamed for not preventing the 9/11 attacks, it 
was determined to take a more aggressive approach to terrorism. The FBI’s 
strategy after 9/11 has been described as an “aggressive, proactive, and 
preventative” approach, identifying “risks to our Nation’s security at the 
 
28 Office of the Inspector Gen., Fed. Bureau of Investigation Casework & Human Res. 
Allocation, Report No. 03-37, Chapter 3: Trends in Resource Utilization FY 1996 Through 
FY 2001 at 27 (Sept. 2003), available at http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/plus/
a0333/final.pdf (“Prior to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the FBI did not devote a significant portion 
of its special agent resources to domestic and international terrorism issues.”). Although the 
FBI designated terrorism as its top priority in 1998, the “FBI did not shift human resources 
accordingly.” Nat’l Comm’n on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, The 9/11 
Commission Report 76–77 (2004), available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/
911Report.pdf.   
29 Douglas A. Brook & Cynthia L. King, Civil Service Reform as National Security: The 
Homeland Security Act of 2002, 67 PUBLIC ADMIN. REV. 399, 399 (2007).  
30 Eric Lichtblau et al., FBI Struggling to Handle Wave of Finance Cases, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 19, 2008, at A1 (describing how, after 9/11, the FBI transferred about one-third of its 
agents in criminal programs to terrorism and intelligence roles).  
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earliest stage possible and to respond with forward-leaning—preventative—
prosecutions.”31 
As a consequence of this shift in strategy, a number of terrorism 
convictions have resulted from the extensive use of thousands of informants, 
who tend to be “working off” criminal or immigration charges, compensated 
financially, or both.32 In many of these cases, informants attempt to induce 
individuals, often law-abiding Muslim-Americans who express some 
sympathy for terrorism, to commit terrorist offenses.33 Several high-profile 
cases of this nature have led to accusations of entrapment in the media as well 
as the courtroom.34 
In some cases, informants have resorted to extraordinary measures to 
persuade individuals to engage in terrorism. These have included repeatedly 
badgering them, offering them jobs, promising hundreds of thousands or even 
millions of dollars, actively attempting to radicalize them, and even 
threatening to kill the defendant or commit suicide if he backs out.35 In 
numerous sting operations, authorities have provided the means needed to 
commit the crime (such as bombs) to people who would have stood little 
chance of acquiring them on their own.36 
Critics (including FBI agent-turned-whistleblower Michael German) 
charge that informants and agents, under intense pressure to generate 
 
31 Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Attorney General, Dep’t of Justice, Prepared Remarks at the 
American Enterprise Institute (May 24, 2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/archive/dag/
speeches/2006/dag_speech_060524.html. 
32 AARONSON, supra note 19, at 44, 97–98, 100–01, 105–11, 137, 162 (noting that in 2008 
the government claimed it had 15,000 informants, and that there are as many as three 
informants working off the books for every informant officially on the list of 15,000).  
33 Id. at 27. 
34 See generally Trevor Aaronson, The Informants, MOTHER JONES, Sept./Oct. 2011, at 30; 
William Glaberson, Newburgh Terrorism Case May Define When Sting Operations Become 
Entrapment, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2010, at A25; Karen Greenberg, How Terrorist 
‘Entrapment’ Ensnares Us All, GUARDIAN (US) (Dec. 12, 2011, 12:45 EST), available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/cifamerica/2011/dec/12/how-terrorist-
entrapment-ensares-us-all; Paul Harris, Fake Terror Plots, Paid Informants: The Tactics of 
FBI ‘Entrapment’ Questioned, GUARDIAN (US) (Nov. 16, 2011, 12:33 EST), available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/nov/16/fbi-entrapment-fake-terror-plots; Schmitt & 
Savage, supra note 4; David K. Shipler, Opinion, Terrorist Plots, Hatched by the F.B.I., N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 29, 2012, at SR4. 
35 United States v. Shareef, No. 10 C 7860, 2011 WL 4888877, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 11, 
2011) (describing the informant’s threats to kill the defendant, and kill himself); see infra notes 
104, 119 and accompanying text (describing inducements and pressure in the Cromitie case); 
see infra note 101 and accompanying text (describing an informant’s attempt at radicalizing 
Siraj); see Erdely, supra note 5, at 74 (describing the informant’s offer of a job to the 
defendants). 
36 See AARONSON, supra note 19, at 9–11, 32–33. 
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convictions, are essentially manufacturing terrorism.37 This results, in their 
view, in convictions that ostensibly justify the FBI’s vast counterterrorism 
budget, but which in fact do nothing to advance public safety. Yet defendants 
in terrorism cases have only asserted the entrapment defense, or the related 
defense of outrageous government conduct, in a small number of cases. 
Neither defense has been successful in blocking a terrorism conviction since 
9/11.38 
B. THE ENTRAPMENT AND OUTRAGEOUS GOVERNMENT CONDUCT 
DEFENSES 
Under the most prominent formulation of the entrapment defense, 
entrapment operates as a complete defense if (1) the defendant was induced 
to commit the crime, and (2) the government fails to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant was predisposed to commit it.39 In most 
jurisdictions, courts can also (in response to the defendant’s motion) dismiss 
cases because of “outrageous government conduct”—government actions 
extreme enough to “shock the conscience” and violate due process.40 
For the government’s conduct to qualify as inducement, the government 
must do more than simply present an opportunity to commit the crime—it 
must create a risk of persuading a person to commit the offense who was not 
already ready to commit it.41 Once the defendant has produced evidence of 
inducement, the burden shifts to the prosecution either to rebut this evidence, 
or to demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was 
predisposed prior to the government contact.42 However, courts often allow 
evidence from the defendant’s later statements or actions to be considered in 
the predisposition inquiry, if this conduct is seen as “independent” from 
government influence.43 
There is no standard definition of predisposition, and courts have 
developed various factors to consider in deciding whether a defendant was 
 
37 See generally German, supra note 2, at 54–56. 
38 See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
39 Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 548–49 (1992). 
40 United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373, 377 (3d Cir. 1978); Stephen A. Miller, Comment, 
The Case for Preserving the Outrageous Government Conduct Defense, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 
305, 312, 317 (1996). 
41 United States v. Wright, 921 F.2d 42, 45 (3d Cir. 1990); United States v. Yater, 756 
F.2d 1058, 1062 (5th Cir. 1985). 
42  Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 553; United States v. Burkley, 591 F.2d 903, 914–15 (D.C. Cir. 
1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 966 (1979). 
43 See Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 550; United States v. Silva, 846 F.2d 352, 356 (6th Cir. 1988). 
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predisposed. Some courts, for example, consider the following factors in the 
predisposition analysis:  
(1) the defendant’s character or reputation; (2) whether the government initially 
suggested the criminal activity; (3) whether the defendant engaged in the criminal 
activity for profit; (4) whether the defendant evidenced a reluctance to commit the 
offense that was overcome by government persuasion; and (5) the nature of the 
inducement or persuasion by the government.44 
In any case, courts agree that when the government simply provides “the 
opportunity to commit a crime . . . the ready commission of the criminal act 
amply demonstrates the defendant’s predisposition.”45 
The Supreme Court contrasts such a scenario with the facts of Jacobson 
v. United States, in which the defendant did not commit the crime of ordering 
child pornography until “he had already been the target of 26 months of 
repeated mailings and communications from Government agents and 
fictitious organizations.”46 In that case, the government “not only excited 
petitioner’s interest in sexually explicit materials banned by law but also 
exerted substantial pressure on petitioner to obtain and read such material as 
part of a fight against censorship and the infringement of individual rights.”47 
The Supreme Court overturned the conviction, since “[r]ational jurors could 
not say beyond a reasonable doubt that petitioner possessed the requisite 
predisposition prior to the Government’s investigation and that it existed 
independent of the Government’s many and varied approaches to 
petitioner.”48 
A minority of jurisdictions employ the “objective” entrapment defense, 
which focuses only on the nature of the government conduct, without 
inquiring into the predisposition of the defendant. Under one version of the 
objective defense, entrapment serves as a complete defense if the government 
induced the offense by either making false representations that the conduct 
was legal, or by engaging in methods of persuasion that generate a substantial 
risk that the offense would be committed by someone otherwise not ready to 
commit it.49 The outrageous government conduct defense, although also 
based on government action, typically requires the conduct to be “so grossly 
shocking as to violate the universal sense of justice.”50 Since courts employ 
 
44 United States v. Hall, 608 F.3d 340, 343 (7th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). 
45 Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 550. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. at 552. 
48 Id. at 553. 
49 HAW. REV. STAT. § 702–237 (West 2014); MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13. 
50 United States v. Bonanno, 852 F.2d 434, 437 (9th Cir. 1988); see Miller, supra note 40, 
at 322–26 (discussing cases in which this doctrine has been applied to block convictions). 
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the doctrine infrequently, no specific guidelines have developed to assist 
courts in applying it. 
C. THE PREVALENCE OF ENTRAPMENT 
Despite numerous accusations of entrapment, the prevalence of 
entrapment (or similar abuses) in terrorism cases remains unclear. 
Determining the prevalence of arguable cases of entrapment is important, 
however, because if there are very few such cases, they may amount to no 
more than a few bad apples, with little policy relevance. If, by contrast, such 
cases are widespread, this would lend urgency to the task of reviewing, and, 
where appropriate, reforming, current counterterrorism practices. Academic 
and journalistic approaches alike tend to focus on a small number of 
particularly egregious and well-known cases.51 The journalist Trevor 
Aaronson built a database of 500 terrorism convictions, and his book 
discusses more cases than other writers on the topic.52 However, the book’s 
analysis is still limited to a relatively small number of cases (about sixteen), 
compared to the overall scale of contemporary terrorism prosecutions.53 
A report by Human Rights Watch analyzed twenty-seven domestic 
terrorism cases, most of which involve potential cases of entrapment.54 While 
this is a larger number of cases than was included in most previous work, it 
still represents a small proportion of post-9/11 terrorism convictions.55 
Inventing Terrorists, a study by Project SALAM and the National Coalition 
to Protect Civil Freedoms, examined 399 cases and determined whether each 
case constituted preventative prosecution or contained elements of 
preventative prosecution.56 Although this study encompassed a large 
proportion of post-9/11 terrorism convictions, it focused on whether cases fit 
within their definition of preventative prosecution, rather than investigating 
 
51 The law review articles with the most detailed treatment of entrapment in terrorism 
prosecutions discuss eight cases and four cases, respectively. See generally Sherman, supra 
note 17; Said, supra note 17. 
52 Trevor Aaronson, Profiles in Terror, MOTHER JONES (last visited on Jan. 31, 2015), 
http://www.motherjones.com/fbi-terrorist?tid_4=All&tid=All&date_filter[value][year]=&
tid_1=All&tid_2=All&tid_5=All&tid_3=All.  
53 See AARONSON, supra note 19 and accompanying text.  
54 See Illusion of Justice: Human Rights Abuses in US Terrorism Prosecutions, HUMAN 
RIGHTS WATCH (July 21, 2014), http://www.hrw.org/reports/2014/07/21/illusion-justice-0.  
55 See infra Part IV.A.  
56 STEPHEN DOWNS & KATHY MANLEY, INVENTING TERRORISTS 15 (2014); see also 
Stephen Downs, Victims of America’s Dirty Wars: Tactics and Reasons from COINTELPRO 
to the War on Terror, PROJECT SALAM (Feb. 15, 2012), http://www.projectsalam.org/
downloads/victims_of_americas_dirty_wars.pdf (earlier, more descriptive study by one of the 
same authors). 
2. NORRIS FINAL FOR PRINTER (CORRECTED OCT. 11) 10/11/2016  9:14 AM 
622 NORRIS & GROL-PROKOPCZYK [Vol. 105 
specific aspects of cases related to the entrapment defense.57 For that reason, 
Inventing Terrorists does not estimate the prevalence or seriousness of 
entrapment allegations in terrorism cases. 
Despite the lack of comprehensive research on entrapment and 
terrorism, distinct views have emerged on the prevalence of entrapment in 
terrorism cases. At one extreme, journalist Joshua Holland, interpreting his 
interview with Trevor Aaronson, claims that only 1% of post-9/11 terrorism 
prosecutions are “real.”58 The implied argument is that informant-led sting 
operations, targeting individuals who would not have otherwise committed 
an act of terrorism, along with other prosecutions only peripherally connected 
to terrorism, account for 99% of post-9/11 terrorism prosecutions. On the 
other end of the spectrum, some observers suggest that there is virtually no 
such thing as entrapment in terrorism prosecutions, because only those 
predisposed to commit acts of terror could be induced into committing one.59 
In the middle, others probably suppose that entrapment may exist, but is 
confined to a small handful of cases.60 
Another lacuna in the literature is the relative lack of academic attention 
to entrapment in alleged cases of right- and left-wing terrorism. Journalistic 
accounts of these issues have claimed that authorities are targeting 
environmentalists, animal rights activists, and “Occupy” activists for 
entrapment, while all but ignoring the more serious threat of far-right 
terrorism.61 A recent article, however, depicts a potential case of entrapment 
among antigovernment militia members in Georgia.62 The prevalence and 
seriousness of entrapment allegations in right- and left-wing terror cases is 
an open question, which this Article attempts to answer. 
II. POTENTIAL ENTRAPMENT INDICATORS 
This Part develops twenty entrapment indicators, drawn from the case 
law on the entrapment and outrageous government conduct defenses, and 
 
57 It should also be noted that Inventing Terrorists omits any case not included in the DOJ’s 
database, leaving out over 150 cases included in our database. 
58 See Holland, supra note 20.  
59 See Stevenson, supra note 21, at 44, and Crovitz, supra note 21. 
60 See, e.g., BRIAN MICHAEL JENKINS, RAND CORP., WOULD-BE WARRIORS 10 (2010), 
available at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2010/RAND_ 
OP292.pdf (noting that informants can easily become agents provocateurs, prompting 
defendants to commit crimes they would have never done on their own, but without suggesting 
that this accounts for a large proportion of cases).  
61 See generally POTTER, supra note 24; Erdely, supra note 5; Perlstein, supra note 5. 
62 Tom Junod, Counter-terrorism Is Getting Complicated, ESQUIRE (Jan. 18, 2012), http://
www.esquire.com/features/waffle-house-terrorists-0212.   
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from a review of terrorism cases. These indicators are described below, and 
the coding criteria for the indicators are presented in Appendix A. This 
Article presumes that it is possible that the type of government action the 
entrapment defense was meant to prevent has become relatively widespread 
in an area of law, even if no court has actually applied the doctrine to block 
a conviction. We begin this Part by discussing briefly why this assumption is 
warranted despite potential formalist or practical objections. 
A. RESPONDING TO POTENTIAL OBJECTIONS 
A strictly formalist analysis might assume that entrapment only exists 
in those cases in which the defendant asserts the defense, and the judge or 
jury applies the defense to block the prosecution. Yet proponents of this 
formalist objection would have difficulty responding to cases in which 
defendants who are exceedingly unlikely to ever commit a terrorist attack are 
persuaded by government informants to commit a staged offense, and yet the 
defense fails or is never raised. 
The Cromitie case illustrates this phenomenon well. Judge McMahon 
clearly believed that Cromitie would have never committed a terrorist offense 
on his own. She acknowledged that he was often hesitant and had to be 
repeatedly pressured into the crime.63 Despite this, she found that his initial 
enthusiasm for the idea of committing an act of terror was enough to sustain 
a finding that he was predisposed.64 
There is something decidedly absurd about a ruling in which the judge 
states in no uncertain terms that the defendant was utterly unable to commit 
the offense and would have never done so on his own, while simultaneously 
ruling that he was predisposed to commit it. The trial court decision was 
upheld by the Second Circuit, but not without a spirited and well-reasoned 
dissent by Chief Judge Dennis Jacobs.65 
Regardless of whether Judge McMahon correctly applied the law of 
entrapment as it existed in her jurisdiction, Cromitie’s conviction violates the 
underlying policy principles behind the entrapment defense.66 When 
 
63 See United States v. Cromitie, No. 09 CR. 558 (CM), 2011 WL 1842219, at *2, *7 
(S.D.N.Y. May 10, 2011), aff’d, 727 F.3d 194 (2d Cir. 2013). 
64 Id. at *7–*8. 
65 United States v. Cromitie, 727 F.3d 194, 227–30 (2d Cir. 2013) (Jacobs, C.J., dissenting 
in part and concurring in part) (concluding that Cromitie was entrapped as a matter of law, 
since the government induced the commission of his offense and he neither had an “already-
formed design” nor exhibited a “ready response” to the inducement). 
66 See Butts v. United States, 273 F. 35, 38 (8th Cir. 1921) (“[I]t is unconscionable, 
contrary to public policy, and to the established law of the land to punish a man for the 
commission of an offense of the like of which he had never been guilty, either in thought or in 
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government agents or informants persuade someone to engage in terrorism 
who would have never otherwise done so, this is an example of the 
“manufacturing of crime” denounced by the Supreme Court.67 If Cromitie 
was as harmless as Judge McMahon believed before he was approached by a 
government informant, then his prosecution is a prime example of what the 
doctrine was designed to prevent. Whether or not this can be formally 
designated as entrapment, it should concern us. 
Despite the presence of such cases, the entrapment defense has not been 
successful in blocking any terrorism conviction since 9/11.68 Some may be 
skeptical of this Article’s approach because it seems difficult to understand 
how such a phenomenon could exist without at least one court recognizing it. 
This could be termed the pragmatic objection. Yet there are a number of 
potential reasons that may explain the apparent failure of the doctrine to block 
questionable terrorism prosecutions. 
First, some defendants with colorable entrapment claims may well have 
opted for pleading guilty, hoping to receive much shorter sentences than they 
would have if the defense had failed at trial.69 
Second, the way the doctrine has developed may have weakened its 
ability to stop entrapment abuses in the terrorism context. The doctrine arose, 
in large part, from cases involving crimes based on widespread, oft-repeated 
behaviors such as selling or using drugs.70 Terrorism, by contrast, is an 
extraordinarily rare crime in the United States,71 with few, if any, repeat 
offenders. It is possible that the doctrine is not particularly well suited to 
ascertaining predisposition among terrorism offenders, given the unusual 
nature of these crimes. It is also possible that courts have developed 
increasingly lenient standards for finding predisposition, following the 
familiar pattern of gradually eroding procedural protections to suit the 
exigencies of the War on Drugs.72 
 
deed, and evidently never would have been guilty of if the officers of the law had not inspired, 
incited, persuaded and lured him to attempt to commit it.”). 
67 Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 372 (1958). 
68 See supra note 12 and accompanying text.  
69 Dru Stevenson, Entrapment by Numbers, 16 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 33–34 nn. 82–
83 (2005) (discussing cases in which defendants later claimed ineffective assistance of counsel 
because their attorneys pressured them to plead guilty, rather than assert the entrapment 
defense). 
70 See PAUL MARCUS, THE ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE § 1.04 (4th ed. 2009) (discussing the 
early major cases, most of which had to do with illegal drug or alcohol sales).  
71 CHARLES KURZMAN, THE MISSING MARTYRS 14 (2011).  
72 See generally Erik Luna, Drug Exceptionalism, 47 VILL. L. REV. 753 (2002); Jason S. 
Marks, Mission Impossible? Rescuing the Fourth Amendment from the War on Drugs, 11 
CRIM. JUST. 16 (1996); David Rudovsky, The Impact of the War on Drugs on Procedural 
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Third, in any individual case, the judge, the jury, or both may be so 
influenced by post-9/11 national anxieties and patriotic fervor that they have 
great difficulty applying the entrapment defense, in even the most egregious 
cases.73 That is, anxieties about terrorism, or stereotypes about Muslim 
terrorists, may make it difficult for factfinders to conclude that defendants 
were not predisposed to commit the offense. This may well have occurred in 
the case of Hamid Hayat, who was convicted of attending a terrorist training 
camp and sentenced to twenty-four years in prison. One juror admitted after 
the trial that she thought Hayat was innocent and that he had been entrapped, 
but she felt too intimidated to vote for acquitting him.74 Reportedly, only one 
juror believed Hayat would have actually carried out any act of terrorism.75 
This should have been enough to preclude a finding of predisposition. 
However, as the foreman later put it, the jury did not “want to see the 
government lose its case,” given “what we know of how people of his 
background have acted in the past.”76 Ultimately, the foreman thought such 
questions were not suited to juries: “We’re not being asked, ‘Did the 
defendant commit the crime?’—whether it’s larceny, murder, whatever. Now 
you’re being asked, ‘Is the defendant capable of doing a crime?’ And I don’t 
think that that is in the . . . level of understanding of the juror.”77 
Fourth, well-documented cognitive errors such as hindsight bias or the 
fundamental attribution error may influence judges and juries to ascribe 
predisposition to defendants even in inappropriate cases.78 
Fifth, the fundamental circularity of some versions of the predisposition 
doctrine, which in practice allow an inference that a defendant was 
predisposed simply because he was successfully induced to commit the 
crime, may have doomed the defense to failure in some cases.79 As one 
 
Fairness and Racial Equality, 1994 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 237 (1994); Steven Wisotsky, 
Crackdown: The Emerging “Drug Exception” to the Bill of Rights, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 889 
(1987).  
73 Said, supra note 17, at 724 (discussing “the limits of the entrapment defense when a 
jury is presented with evidence of anti-American views expressed from an Islamist 
perspective”). 
74 Demian Bulwa, Juror Tells of Pressure to Convict Terrorism Suspect: She Tells Judge 
in Lodi Case She Regrets Her Guilty Vote and Accuses Jury Foreman of Misconduct—Other 
Panelists Deny It, S. F. CHRON. (Apr. 28, 2006, 4:00 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/
article/SACRAMENTO-Juror-tells-of-pressure-to-convict-2536440.php. 
75 Amy Waldman, Prophetic Justice, THE ATLANTIC, Oct. 2006, at 82, 92. 
76 Id. at 93. 
77 Id. 
78 Kevin A. Smith, Note, Psychology, Factfinding, and Entrapment, 103 MICH. L. REV. 
759, 788 (2005); see Jesse J. Norris, Why the FBI and the Courts Are Wrong About Terrorism 
and Entrapment, 84 MISS. L.J. 1257 (2015). 
79 Philip Mullock, The Logic of Entrapment, 46 U. PITT. L. REV. 739, 750 (1985). 
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scholar summarizes this distorted view of the doctrine, “[I]f we ask, ‘why did 
he do it?’ the answer is, ‘because he was predisposed to do it;’ and if we ask, 
‘why was he predisposed to do it?’ the answer is, ‘because he did it.’”80 Given 
the possibly tautological nature of the doctrine, we should not assume that a 
lack of entrapment rulings corresponds to a lack of entrapment abuses. 
Finally, government misconduct, whether by police agencies or 
prosecutors, may have prevented some defendants from accessing discovery 
that would have supported an entrapment defense.81 Although there is not 
evidence of widespread government misconduct in these cases, there are 
signs that misconduct is occurring. For example, the convictions in the 
“Detroit Sleeper Cell” case were reversed after it was revealed that 
prosecutors withheld key information from the defense.82 
Furthermore, journalist Trevor Aaronson has shown that the FBI often 
claims not to have recorded particularly important conversations between the 
informant and the defendant.83 Former FBI agent James Wedick, a thirty-
five-year veteran of the Bureau, suggests that such conversations were left 
unrecorded not for any legitimate reason, but rather to make it easier to win 
the case in court.84 While this does not prove nefarious motives, it raises the 
question of whether those conversations were not recorded because of a 
perceived danger that the recordings could support an entrapment defense. 
B. THE NATURE OF THE INDICATORS 
This Article does not intend to suggest that the presence of one, or a 
certain number, of the indicators discussed in the next subpart definitively 
indicates entrapment, outrageous government conduct, or even the violation 
of the public policies underlying these doctrines. Rather, due to the variety 
of ways the entrapment defense is formulated in different jurisdictions within 
the United States, and the uncertainty of whether the doctrine ought to be 
applied in any specific case, this Article understands the indicators as raising 
the likelihood that entrapment, borderline entrapment, or outrageous 
government conduct took place. As mentioned earlier, borderline entrapment 
is meant to refer to a case that offends the policy concerns underlying the 
 
80 Id. 
81 Jackie Lu, How Terror Changed Justice: A Call to Reform Safeguards That Protect 
Against Prosecutorial Misconduct, 14 J.L. & POL’Y 377, 379–80 (2006). 
82 Bennett L. Gershman, How Juries Get It Wrong—Anatomy of the Detroit Terror Case, 
44 WASHBURN L.J. 327, 330 (2005). This case was not included in the databases for this 
Article, because the relevant acts in the case occurred before September 11, 2001. 
83 AARONSON, supra note 19, at 181–99. 
84 Id. at 195–96. 
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entrapment doctrine, even if the case may not qualify as entrapment in the 
particular jurisdiction. 
The first ten indicators were derived from relevant case law, and the 
second ten were developed from recurrent fact patterns observed in a review 
of the alleged cases of entrapment in terrorism prosecutions. The indicators 
are not equal in their ability to predict the presence of entrapment. As 
mentioned in the results subpart below, some of the indicators are more 
central to most courts’ entrapment analyses, and particular indicators may be 
dispositive in some cases. The coding criteria for the indicators, as presented 
in Appendix A, were designed to eliminate or minimize overlap between the 
indicators. 
An exhaustive analysis of all the facts of each case, a task far beyond 
the scope of this Article, would be necessary to make a fully reasoned 
determination of whether each case is the type of case the entrapment defense 
was designed to prevent. What this Article’s analysis provides is not 
certainty, but a rough estimation of the extent of facts and allegations that 
would support an entrapment or outrageous government conduct defense. 
C. INDICATORS DERIVED FROM CASE LAW 
The case law on entrapment and the outrageous government conduct 
defense provides a number of indicators.85 Each of these are factors that, at 
least in some jurisdictions, weigh in favor of a finding of entrapment, a 
finding that the defendant was not predisposed, or a determination that the 
government’s conduct was so outrageous as to warrant dismissal on due 
process grounds. For the purposes of illustration, one or more brief examples 
are provided for each indicator. The specific criteria used for coding these 
cases in the database are provided in Appendix A. 
The first ten indicators can be divided into two groupings. The first six 
“core” indicators correspond to the factors most often used by courts in 
deciding whether to apply the entrapment defense. The next four (7 through 
10) are less central to most courts’ analyses and may not be considered by 
many courts. 
 
85 We do not separate the two doctrines for the purposes of the list of indicators. This is 
because, regardless of which doctrine applies, the result would be the same: the judge would 
block the prosecution. Furthermore, compiling two lists, one for entrapment and one for 
outrageous government conduct, would be cumbersome to apply, since there is considerable 
overlap between the two doctrines as they have been applied by courts.  
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D. THE CORE SIX ENTRAPMENT FACTORS 
1. No previous terrorism offenses. One factor in courts’ predisposition 
analyses is the defendant’s lack of previous involvement in the same type of 
crime (which for the purposes of this Article would mean terrorist offenses) 
before the informant entered the scene.86 An additional, though related, 
consideration sometimes mentioned in the case law is whether the defendant 
had been a hardworking, model citizen before the informant became 
involved.87 
Since this is a particularly widespread indicator in terrorism cases, any 
number of examples is available. One noteworthy case is that of Mohammed 
Hossain and Yassin Aref, two immigrants who by all accounts were law-
abiding before being targeted for inducement by the FBI. The FBI informant 
befriended Hossain, at some point mentioning that he was involved in selling 
arms to terrorists, and later offered Hossain a $45,000 loan (and a $5,000 gift) 
to help with his businesses.88 Aref, an imam, witnessed the loan. Both were 
convicted of material support for terrorism, based on the money laundering 
allegedly implicit in the transaction.89 
2. Government proposed the crime. If the government agent or 
informant provided the defendant with the idea for the crime, this weighs 
against predisposition.90 Whether the “criminal design originates with the 
officials of the Government” has been a key factor for many courts’ 
entrapment analyses.91 
In several of the cases involving terrorist plots, the informants have 
suggested particular targets. In many other cases, the informant pushes the 
defendant to plan an attack, while asking the defendant to pick the target 
himself. In a case involving a bomb plot by five Occupy Cleveland activists 
(known as the Cleveland Five), the informant himself proposed the idea of 
blowing up a bridge.92 
 
86 United States v. Reyes, 239 F.3d 722, 739 (5th Cir. 2001) (listing “demonstrated 
knowledge or experience with the criminal activity under investigation” and “the character of 
the defendant, including past criminal history” as factors in the entrapment analysis). 
87 Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 441 (1932) (noting that the defendant was “an 
industrious, law-abiding citizen” who was “otherwise innocent,” until the government agent 
prevailed upon him to break the law). 
88 AARONSON, supra note 19, at 117, 134. 
89 United States v. Aref, 533 F.3d 72, 76 (2d Cir. 2008). 
90 United States v. Navarro, 737 F.2d 625, 635 (7th Cir. 1984) (including “whether the 
suggestion of criminal activity was originally made by the Government” as one of five factors 
for determining predisposition). 
91 For examples, see Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 442; Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540 
(1992). 
92 See Perlstein, supra note 5. 
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3. Informant pressure or persuasion. If the government agent or 
informant pressured the defendant to participate in the crime, this weighs 
against a finding of predisposition, particularly if the pressure was repeated.93 
This pressure can range from emotional manipulation to violent threats. In 
the case of Hamid Hayat, an informant befriended him and then repeatedly 
harassed him, pressuring him to attend a terrorist training camp in Pakistan.94 
For example, the informant called him in Pakistan to berate him, in an 
expletive-filled rant, for his laziness, saying “Be a man. Do something,” and 
threatening to “force” him by the “throat.”95 
If this pressure is especially intense or manipulative, it could also 
support an outrageous government conduct defense.96 For example, the 
informant in Derrick Shareef’s case threatened to slit Shareef’s throat if he 
backed out of their plot to attack a shopping mall with grenades.97 The 
informant also threatened to commit suicide if Shareef refused to go through 
with the plan, and made other threats to ensure Shareef agreed to participate 
in the attack.98 In such an extreme case, it would seem reasonable to block 
the conviction on due process grounds.99 
Similarly, if the government agent or informant persuaded the defendant 
that the crime was justified or otherwise appropriate, this should support an 
entrapment defense.100 In the case of Matin Siraj (who was convicted of 
plotting to bomb a subway station), the informant actively attempted to 
radicalize him, by touting 9/11 conspiracy theories, bemoaning the West’s 
supposed war on Islam, and showing him pictures of the torture of Iraqi 
citizens by U.S. troops at Abu Ghraib.101 In another case, eighteen-year-old 
 
93 The repeated nature of the government’s attempts to induce Jacobson is perhaps the 
most significant indicator of entrapment, or lack of predisposition, identified by the Jacobson 
court.  
94 Bio, WEDICK & ASSOCIATES FBI EXPERT, http://www.fbiexpert.com/investigative-
profile.php (last visited Apr. 24, 2015) [hereinafter Wedick Bio]; Melissa McNamara, Calif. 
Man Found Guilty In Terror Case, CBS NEWS (Apr. 25, 2006, 2:25 PM), http://www.cbsnews.
com/news/calif-man-found-guilty-in-terror-case/. 
95 Wedick Bio, supra note 94.  
96 Greene v. United States, 454 F.2d 783, 787 (9th Cir. 1971) (finding outrageous 
government conduct when the pressure to commit the crime was a veiled threat). 
97 See United States v. Shareef, No. 10 C 7860, 2011 WL 4888877, at *5 (N.D. Ill. 2011). 
The government characterized this comment as a “joke.” Id.  
98 Id. 
99 See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
100 Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 548 (1992) (“In their zeal to enforce the law, 
however, Government agents may not originate a criminal design, implant in an innocent 
person’s mind the disposition to commit a criminal act, and then induce commission of the 
crime so that the Government may prosecute.”). 
101 ETHAN BROWN, SNITCH 124–26 (2007). 
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Adel Daoud was persuaded to participate in a terror attack on a Chicago bar 
in part because the informant told him that a particular foreign imam wanted 
him to participate and gave his blessing to the attack.102 If the informant had 
not invented this imam, it is possible that Daoud would have listened to his 
own imams, who insisted that violent jihad was inconsistent with Islam.103 
The informant in the Cromitie case encouraged Cromitie’s anti-Semitic 
ramblings by adding his own anecdotes about Jewish domination and 
claiming that Jews “are responsible for all of the evils in the world.”104 
If the informant takes advantage of a defendant’s sympathies, 
friendship, or personal weaknesses (such as poverty or financial problems),105 
this potentially casts doubt on the defendant’s predisposition. This can occur 
if the informant becomes close friends with the defendant, or exploits a 
preexisting friendship, aiming to take advantage of the friendship to induce 
the defendant to commit the offense.106 For example, in Hamid Hayat’s case, 
the informant spent so much time with Hayat that Hayat referred to him as 
his brother and best friend.107 
A less common method, known in the terminology of espionage as the 
“honeypot” strategy, involves the informant using the promise of a sexual or 
romantic relationship to induce the defendant.108 An example of this allegedly 
 
102 Kim Janssen, Alleged Bomber ‘Immature’, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Sept. 18, 2012, at 11. 
103 Id. 
104 Kareem Fahim, On Tapes, Terror Suspect Brags and Reveals His Hate, N.Y. TIMES, 
August 31, 2010, at A17; Laguardia, supra note 12, at 203.  
105 Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 376 (1958) (“[T]he defense of entrapment is 
designed to overcome” a situation in which “the Government plays on the weaknesses of an 
innocent party and beguiles him into committing crimes which he otherwise would not have 
attempted.”); United States v. Dion, 762 F.2d 674, 689–90 (8th Cir. 1985), rev’d in part, 476 
U.S. 734 (1986) (“The risk for the government in offering so much money to these [“extremely 
impoverished”] individuals over a nearly two-and-one-half year period was that many who 
would never have shot a protected bird would be enticed into doing so.”); State v. Taylor, 599 
P.2d 496, 503 (Utah 1979) (“Extreme pleas of desperate illness or appeals based primarily on 
sympathy, pity, or close personal friendship, or offers of inordinate sums of money, are 
examples, depending on an evaluation of the circumstances in each case, of what might 
constitute prohibited police conduct.”). 
106 Taylor, 599 P.2d at 504 (“The record is replete with evidence as to defendant’s 
motivation to accommodate Annette Stubbs, viz., his sympathy, his pity, and his close personal 
relationship with her.”); MARCUS, supra note 70, § 3.03 (“Creating a personal relationship is 
a common fact pattern which can lead to entrapment.”). 
107 Jeff Barnard, Friends Unaware of FBI Informant, THE SPOKESMAN-REVIEW (Spokane, 
Washington), Apr. 16, 2006, at B6. 
108 People v. Wisneski, 292 N.W.2d 196, 199 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980) (“Police 
encouragement of an agent’s use of sex to induce one who is unwilling and unready to commit 
a crime constitutes entrapment.”); HANK PRUNCKUN, COUNTERINTELLIGENCE THEORY AND 
PRACTICE 199 (2012) (discussing the use of the term “honeypot” to refer to situations in which 
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occurred in the case of Eric McDavid, who was convicted of plotting 
“ecoterrorist” bombings.109 A paid FBI informant, known only as “Anna,” 
briefly began a romantic relationship with McDavid, but called it off, telling 
him that it needed to wait until after their “mission.”110  
Even when the defendant himself—and not the informant—proposes 
the idea for the attack, the fact that no plot existed before the informant 
became involved should weigh against a finding of predisposition. In some 
cases of this nature, the informant encouraged or pressured the defendant to 
come up with a plan of action. For example, according to McDavid’s 
appellate briefing, “Anna” repeatedly urged McDavid and his friends to 
formulate a plan.111  Sami Hassoun (who was prosecuted for trying to plant a 
bomb near Wrigley Field in Chicago) described in his sentencing 
memorandum how the informant repeatedly encouraged him to plan a 
terrorist attack and claimed that Hassoun would be paid millions of dollars 
for his ideas.112 The defendants in the NATO Three and Cleveland Five cases 
seemed content to lazily fantasize about (largely unrealistic) potential 
actions, while the informants took charge, browbeating them into formulating 
and following through on a specific plan.113 
 
a sexual relationship is initiated for the purpose of intelligence gathering). 
109 McDavid alleged that Anna tried to “string him along romantically,” in order to 
successfully induce him to commit the offense. United States v. McDavid, 396 F. App’x 365, 
369 (9th Cir. 2010). She seems to have done this by responding to his advances by saying that 
“we need to put the mission first. There’s time for romance later.” Andrea Todd, The Believers, 
ELLE, Apr. 2008, at 266, 323. Alternatively, there are indications they may have begun some 
kind of romantic relationship, which Anna put on hold until after the “mission.” “McDavid 
brought up the stalled relationship during a pizza run he made with Anna. ‘She said she wanted 
to slow it down,’ he told me, ‘in order to do what she wanted to do—the mission—and then 
pick it up later.’” Dean Kuipers, Honey Stinger, OUTSIDE MAGAZINE, Dec. 2012, at 60, 75. 
110 See supra note 109 and accompanying text.  
111 See Appellant’s Opening Brief at 14, 20, 21, United States v. McDavid, 396 F. App’x 
365 (9th Cir. 2010); Kuipers, supra note 109, at 71–75. 
112 Defendant’s Sentencing Memorandum at 19–20, United States v. Hassoun, 10-CR-
773-1 (N.D. Ill. 2013). 
113 See Brown, supra note 24 (discussing “tapes, which mostly feature Church running off 
at the mouth about all the trouble he’d like to cause, if he could only figure out how”); Erdely, 
supra note 5; Eric Zorn, NATO Three Stooges?, CHANGE OF SUBJECT (Jan. 27, 2014), http://
blogs.chicagotribune.com/news_columnists_ezorn/2014/01/nato-three-stooges.html 
(commenting on the evidence from the tapes, “it really looks as though these mopey wanna-
bes were too baked and aimless ever to have posed a serious terrorist threat to the public,” and 
“[t]he picture that’s emerging from the coverage is of a trio of inept stoners with inchoate 
violent impulses and delusions of grandeur and feck who were egged on by undercover cops 
and then grossly overcharged by an overheated state’s attorney’s office”); Opening Statements 
Conclude, Undercover Cop “Gloves” Begins Testimony, FREE THE NATO 3 (Jan. 21, 2014), 
http://freethenato3.wordpress.com/2014/01/21/opening-statements-conclude-undercover-
cop-gloves-begins-testimony/. 
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If the inducement of the crime occurred over a lengthy time period, this 
suggests that the defendant was not predisposed to commit the offense, but 
rather had to be repeatedly encouraged or persuaded to commit it.114 The 
informant in the Siraj case, for example, spent over two and a half years 
pretending to be Siraj’s jihadist friend before Siraj was arrested and 
charged.115 
4. Material incentive. If the government or informant offered money or 
other material incentives for participating in the crime, this weighs against 
predisposition.116 This factor is most persuasive when the rewards are 
excessive compared to what a criminal might normally achieve for 
committing the crime, absent government involvement.117 
For example, James Cromitie only agreed to participate in a terror attack 
“after a dogged and year-long campaign of nagging, pursuit, and temptation 
(with money, a business, and a Mercedes-Benz).”118 The government 
informant told Cromitie, a destitute Walmart employee, that he would pay 
him $250,000 to commit the attack.119 The informant also promised, among 
other things, that he would buy Cromitie a barbershop and pay for a vacation 
in Puerto Rico.120 
5. Defendant’s reluctance. If the defendant was initially or at some point 
reluctant to participate in the crime, this weighs in favor of entrapment. This 
has sometimes been described as the most important factor in determining 
predisposition.121 
 
114 Although the length of inducement has not been listed as a separate factor, courts have 
sometimes mentioned it in the course of explaining why the evidence favors the entrapment 
defense. Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 550 (1992) (holding that the predisposition 
had not been proven, because the defendant had “been the target of 26 months of repeated 
mailings and communications from Government agents and fictitious organizations” before 
he was induced to commit the crime).  
115 Jennifer Jenkins, Bay Ridge Terror Case Raises Debate About Entrapment, THE 
BROOKLYN INK (Sept. 10, 2010), http://archives.jrn.columbia.edu/2010-2011/
thebrooklynink.com/2010/09/10/14114-bay-ridge-terror-case-raises-debate-about-
entrapment/index.html. 
116 Grossman v. State, 457 P.2d 226, 230 (Alaska 1969) (“[O]ffers of profit which are 
grossly disproportionate to what is reasonably expectable in that traffic should not be permitted 
when those offers would have the effect of overwhelming the self-control of a normal 
person.”); State v. Lively, 921 P.2d 1035, 1046–47 (Wash. 1996) (listing “promises of 
excessive profits” as a factor in a due process analysis).  
117 Grossman, 457 P.2d at 230.  
118 United States v. Cromitie, 727 F.3d 194, 227 (2d Cir. 2013) (Jacobs, C.J., dissenting). 
119 Id. at 211 (majority opinion). 
120 Id. 
121 United States v. Busby, 780 F.2d 804, 807 (9th Cir. 1986). 
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In the Cromitie case, considered by at least one observer to be the single 
most egregious example of entrapment in terrorism cases,122 Cromitie was 
remarkably reluctant to participate in the terrorist attack, and only succumbed 
after numerous attempts at persuasion over the course of a year.123 Matin Siraj 
expressed his reluctance to participate in terrorism by saying that he did not 
want to cause any deaths, and by claiming that he had to ask his mother for 
permission.124 Connor Stevens, one of the five Occupy Cleveland activists 
who plotted to blow up a bridge, attempted to back out of the plot, but the 
informant had at one point said he would fire him if he did so.125 
6. Governmental control of the crime. Whether the government and/or 
the informant exhibited a high level of control over criminal activity, rather 
than allowing the crime to happen on its own, has long been a factor in courts’ 
entrapment analyses.126 Near-complete government control of the crime is 
typical in sting operations. In the case of Hemant Lakhani, the informant 
proposed buying a missile from him, but when Lakhani turned out to be 
utterly incapable of procuring a missile, the government arranged for a 
Russian undercover agent to sell him a missile, so that Lakhani could sell it 
to the informant.127 Courts have sometimes held that in such cases, when the 
government provides the defendant with the goods that the defendant is 
convicted of selling, entrapment occurred as a matter of law.128 
 
122 Greenberg, supra note 34 (describing the Cromitie case as the “most egregious 
example” of government involvement in creating terrorism offenses). 
123 See United States v. Cromitie, No. 09 CR. 558 (CM) 2011 WL 1842219, at *2–*6 
(S.D.N.Y. May 10, 2011), aff’d, 727 F.3d 194 (2d Cir. 2013) (“Cromitie certainly talked the 
talk of a terrorist. . . . But he was reluctant to walk the walk. . . . Cromitie argues that he 
repeatedly refused to follow through on what he was saying, and that [he] refused to do 
anything other than talk about jihad for many, many months. Despite Hussain’s prodding, 
Cromitie failed to introduce Hussain to any ‘like-minded brothers’ who would participate in a 
‘sutra team.’ He declined to provide any guns, pick any targets, decide what equipment would 
be needed, come up with any code words, or make any concrete plans. Cromitie expressed 
reluctance to get involved personally in any attack: He did not want to go to Afghanistan . . . 
and he was evasive when asked by Hussain if he would ‘go to jihad.’”). 
124 STEPHAN SALISBURY, MOHAMED’S GHOSTS 182 (2010). 
125 See Erdely, supra note 5, at 75. 
126 Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 451 (1932) (stating that the “controlling 
question” is “whether the defendant is a person otherwise innocent whom the Government is 
seeking to punish for an alleged offense which is the product of the creative activity of its own 
officials”); State v. Lively, 921 P.2d 1035, 1046 (Wash. 1996) (listing “whether the 
government controls the criminal activity or simply allows for the criminal activity to occur” 
as a factor in determining whether government action in a case offends due process) (internal 
citation omitted). 
127 Petra Bartosiewicz, I.O.U. One Terrorist: Rounding Up “Al Qaeda,” One Stooge at a 
Time, HARPER’S MAG., Aug. 1, 2005, at 48, 48. 
128 United States v. Bueno, 447 F.2d 903, 905 (5th Cir. 1971). 
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E. OTHER CASE-LAW-DERIVED FACTORS 
7. Government provided the means. If the government agent or 
informant provided the defendant with the money or other means necessary 
for the crime, this can support a finding of entrapment or outrageous 
government conduct.129 When the physical means are hard to come by, as in 
the case of bombs, or the defendant has no money, this indicator is of 
particular relevance.130 
Examples of this indicator abound. After Hosam Smadi, a nineteen-
year-old, was found discussing jihad in an online forum, an undercover FBI 
agent developed a relationship with him. The agent eventually supplied him 
with a car bomb, which Smadi agreed to detonate under a Dallas 
skyscraper.131 In many similar cases, the government has provided 
individuals with the equipment needed to carry out attacks.132 
8. Government spoon-feeding. If the government agent or informant 
provided the defendant with detailed logistical support to enable to the 
defendant to carry out the actions needed for the crime, this may weigh 
against a finding of predisposition.133 This suggests that the defendant would 
have lacked the know-how to carry out the offense on his or her own. 
For example, José Pimentel, a mentally ill convert to Islam who was 
convicted of attempting to make a pipe bomb for a terrorist attack, had to be 
given precise instructions for each step of the manufacturing process.134 He 
 
129 United States v. Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d 1196, 1202 (7th Cir. 1994) (“Pickard and 
Hollingsworth had no prayer of becoming money launderers without the government’s aid. . . . 
Whatever it takes to become an international money launderer, they did not have it.”); United 
States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373, 380 (3d Cir. 1978) (applying the outrageous government 
conduct doctrine when the government supplied the means); Greene v. United States, 454 F.2d 
783, 786–87 (9th Cir. 1971) (same). 
130 Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d at 1202–03 (suggesting that lack of means can preclude a 
finding of predisposition if the defendants would not have been able to acquire the means on 
their own). 
131 Jason Trahan, Bomb Plotter Gets 24 Years, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Oct. 20, 2010, at 
A1.   
132 See AARONSON, supra note 19, at 21, 147–49, 170, 177–78. 
133 Commonwealth v. Matthews, 500 A.2d 853, 857 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (upholding a 
trial court’s finding of outrageous government conduct when “Defendants were extremely 
inept in consummating the crime attempted,” and “police not only set the stage for the criminal 
act but also were principal players thereon without which Defendants could not have acted”) 
(internal citation omitted); see also United States v. Arteaga, 807 F.2d 424, 427 (5th Cir. 1986) 
(requiring government overinvolvement in the offense and a passive role by the defendant to 
establish the outrageous government conduct defense). 
134  William K. Rashbaum & Joseph Goldstein, Informer’s Role in Terror Case Is Said to 
Have Deterred F.B.I., N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2011, at A1; Joe Coscarelli, Accused Terrorist 
Jose Pimentel Got High with Informant, Needed Help with Everything, N.Y.  MAG. (Nov. 22, 
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also had trouble performing some of the tasks (such as drilling holes in the 
pipe) on his own.135 The informant offered his apartment as a bomb-making 
laboratory (since Pimentel lived with his uncle), and the informant went 
shopping with him to buy the ingredients for the bomb.136 The NYPD 
informant’s role in the crime was so pervasive, and Pimentel was viewed as 
so incompetent, that off-the-record FBI agents reported that the FBI was 
uninterested in getting involved in the case, due to the likelihood of 
entrapment.137 
9. Defendant’s financial motivation. If there is evidence that the 
defendant was primarily interested in the money, rather than committing the 
terrorist act for its own sake, this should weigh against a finding of 
predisposition in many cases. In nonterrorism entrapment cases, this has been 
considered an indicator that the defendant was predisposed to commit the 
crime.138 In terrorism cases, however, if the defendant’s primary motivation 
appears to be financial, this raises two questions. 
First, is the defendant only cooperating with the informant’s terrorist 
plans in order to reap financial awards? If so, this suggests that he is not 
predisposed to commit terrorism, but rather finds it hard to turn down an 
opportunity to make money.139 This appears to have been the case with Sami 
Hassoun, for example, as discussed below.140 Second, it also raises the 
question of whether the defendant is attempting to scam the informant out of 
his or her money, without actually committing the offense. For these reasons, 
 
2011, 8:10 AM), http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2011/11/jose-pimentel-a-indeed.html. 
135 Rashbaum & Goldstein, supra note 134.  
136 Jennifer Peltz, Jose Pimentel Informant Has Own Legal Woes: Attorney, HUFFINGTON 
POST (Nov. 23, 2011, 9:14 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/11/23/jose-pimentel-
informant-h_n_1109806.html. 
137 Rashbaum & Goldstein, supra note 134.  
138 United States v. Navarro, 737 F.2d 625, 635 (7th Cir. 1984) (including as one of the 
five predisposition factors “whether the defendant was engaged in criminal activity for a 
profit”) (internal citation omitted). 
139 Benjamin Weiser, Citing Terror Defendants’ Motivation, Judge Shows Sentencing 
Leniency, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2012, at A27  (“At Mr. Issa’s sentencing [for a terrorist offense 
involving a drug deal in Africa], one of his lawyers, Julia L. Gatto, a federal public defender, 
told [federal district court] Judge Jones that the Malian ambassador to the United States had 
remarked to her after visiting her client in jail: ‘If your country is going to come to my country 
and offer our young men lots of money to transport drugs or do things criminal, you’d better 
tell your country to build a lot more prisons, because we are very poor people and it is very 
hard to pass that up.’”). 
140 See United States v. McDavid, 396 F. App’x 365, 369 (9th Cir. 2010) (“The third factor 
is whether there was a profit motive. . . . McDavid seemed motivated by a strongly held 
anarchic ideology, which is arguably a stronger indicator of predisposition than a profit 
motive.”). 
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a primarily financial motivation should weigh against predisposition, at least 
in cases involving crimes, such as terrorist attacks, which ordinarily would 
never be committed except for ideological reasons.141 
When the informant gave Cromitie a camera to engage in surveillance 
of potential sites for their attack, Cromitie promptly sold the camera for 
$50.142 Ahmed Ferhani, who had led the informant to believe he was buying 
guns to supply to terrorists, was arrested as the purchase took place. In fact, 
he was considering selling them for a profit—to non-terrorists.143 While 
being arrested on terrorism charges, he received his first call from a potential 
buyer.144 As in the Pimentel case, the investigation of Ferhani was so 
problematic that the FBI reportedly refused to get involved in the case.145 
In the Liberty City Seven case, which involved an alleged plot to bomb 
the Sears Tower, the informant offered the defendants $50,000 if they would 
carry out an attack. One of the defendants, a man described as a “natural-born 
bullshitter and hustler” who was “recorded in conversation after conversation 
asking how soon he’ll have the cash,” told the court that he was trying to 
swindle the informant out of the money.146 
10. Informant payments/bonus. If the informant was paid by the 
government, paid a bonus if a conviction was successfully obtained, or 
achieved the dismissal of criminal or other charges for his or her services, 
this gave the informant a strong incentive to successfully induce individuals 
to commit crimes.147 This information is not always publicly available, but 
 
141 However, in prosecutions of those potentially well-placed to help terrorists (such as 
weapons dealers) for crimes other than attacks, a financial motivation should not necessarily 
count against predisposition. Arguably, in such cases a financial motivation should not weigh 
in favor of predisposition either, because, as argued below, the predisposition should be 
reworked so that it is based on the realistic likelihood of the defendant committing similar 
offenses, rather than an abstract consideration of a defendant’s personal tendencies. The fact 
that a drug or weapons dealer, already in the business of making money through these sales, 
had a financial motivation to commit a crime, really tells us little or nothing about whether he 
or she would have been likely, in the real world, to commit a terrorism offense on his or her 
own. 
142 Petra Bartosiewicz, To Catch a Terrorist: The FBI Hunts for the Enemy Within, 
HARPER’S MAG., Aug. 2011, at 37, 44. 
143 John Knefel, Did the NYPD Entrap Ahmed Ferhani?, THE NATION, Mar. 5, 2013, at 
18, 21. 
144 Id. 
145 Id. at 18 (noting that the investigations were “based on a premise so shaky that the 
FBI—no stranger to dubious terror prosecutions—refused to get involved”). 
146 AARONSON, supra note 19, at 74–75, 83; Aaronson, supra note 34, at 40; Chuck 
Goudie, Mission: Blow Up Sears Tower; Sentence: 13 Years, ABC 7 CHICAGO (Nov. 20, 2009, 
4:14 PM), http://abc7chicago.com/archive/7129306.  
147  United States v. Gray, 626 F. 2d 494, 499 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1091 
2. NORRIS FINAL FOR PRINTER (CORRECTED OCT. 11) 10/11/2016  9:14 AM 
2015] ESTIMATING THE PREVALENCE OF ENTRAPMENT 637 
when this factor is present, it raises the risk that the informant manipulated 
the defendant to concoct or complete the plot. Though this factor is not 
commonly considered by courts, some courts have dismissed cases in which 
the informant was promised a bonus upon convicting a particular 
individual.148 
In one case, the informant was in jail on charges of molesting his 
stepdaughters when he contacted the FBI, telling them he had information on 
a plot by members of a right-wing militia.149 In truth, there was no plot as 
such, only occasional discussions on a web forum about the desirability of 
sparking an antigovernment uprising by assassinating federal officials.150 The 
informant, released from jail on the FBI’s behest, began posting on the 
website, urging the participants to put their ruminations into action.151 
Once the informant finally got them to meet in person and discuss their 
ideas, the defendants were arrested, and the informant’s charges were 
dropped.152 In this case, the informant’s strong motivation to generate a 
conviction lends greater credibility to the claim that he manufactured a crime. 
In a number of other cases, the FBI paid informants significant salaries, even 
amounting to hundreds of thousands of dollars, as well as arranging for 
prosecutors to drop various types of criminal and immigration charges.153 
Some courts have considered whether the government’s “sole motive 
was to obtain a conviction” as a factor in the outrageous government conduct 
analysis.154 Although this may well be an appropriate question for courts to 
consider, we do not include it as an indicator. This is because it calls for a 
broad conclusion about the government’s motives rather than a specific 
factual characteristic of the case. Many of the twenty indicators, if present in 
 
(1981) (describing “high informant fees” as “suspect,” but reserving dismissal for cases in 
which the fee would only be paid for conviction of a particular defendant); State v. Glosson, 
462 So. 2d 1082, 1085 (Fla. 1985) (describing a great “potential for abuse” when the informant 
“had an enormous financial incentive not only to make criminal cases, but also to color his 
testimony or even commit perjury in pursuit of the contingent fee”). 
148 See Glosson, 462 So. 2d at 1085. 




153 For example, in the Hayat case, the informant was allegedly paid $250,000. Randal C. 
Archibold, Diverging Views of Californian at Terror Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2006, at A14. 
154 United States v. Gardner, 658 F. Supp. 1573, 1579 (internal citation omitted) (W.D. 
Pa. 1987); see also Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 442 (1932) (finding the defense of 
entrapment is available when government officials “implant in the mind of an innocent person 
the disposition to commit the alleged offense and induce its commission in order that they may 
prosecute”). 
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a case, will suggest that the government’s (or the informant’s) main 
motivation was to obtain a conviction rather than protect the public.155 
F. INDICATORS DERIVED FROM TERRORISM CASES 
The second ten indicators were derived from recurrent features of some 
of those terrorism cases most commonly criticized as possible entrapment. 
The first four indicators relate to problematic aspects of the informant’s or 
the government’s behavior in a case. The next three indicators involve 
questionable circumstances regarding the initial targeting of the defendant 
for inducement. The final three are characteristics of the defendants that raise 
the risk that entrapment or outrageous government conduct occurred. 
1. Problematic Informant or Government Practices 
11. Informant’s characteristics. If there is something suspect about the 
informant as an individual, such as his personal history or his behavior in the 
case, which casts doubt on his reliability or shows his predilection towards 
manipulating others, this should weigh against a finding of predisposition. 
Since this raises the risk that the informant manipulated the defendant into 
doing something he or she would never have done independently, it suggests 
that the policy reasons underlying the entrapment defense may have been 
violated. 
In some cases, the informant is known as a highly charismatic person.156 
This raises the risk that the informant manipulated the defendant into 
engaging in a terrorist action, even though he otherwise would not have done 
so. For example, the informant Brandon Darby, a charismatic leftist activist 
known for his heroics in post-Katrina New Orleans, has been accused of 
entrapping two much younger men, whom he persuaded to accompany him 
to protest at the Republican National Convention in Minneapolis.157 Even if 
he did not suggest the precise crime the young men are accused of committing 
 
155 Arguably, if a defendant would have never committed a terror offense without 
government inducement, then there would be no conceivable public safety motive for inducing 
the defendant, leaving the bare desire for a conviction as the most plausible motivation. The 
only exception to this might be the goal of creating general deterrence against would-be 
terrorist conspirators (which raises its own practical and ethical questions). See generally 
Anthony M. Dillof, Unraveling Unlawful Entrapment, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 827 
(2004); Norris, supra note 78. 
156 See Barnard, supra note 107 (describing the informant in the Hayat case as a 
“charmer”). 
157 Josh Harkinson, How a Radical Leftist Became the FBI’s BFF, MOTHER JONES, 
Sept./Oct. 2011, at 48, 49–50.   
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(building and planning to use Molotov cocktails), his constant stream of 
rousing, ultra-radical rhetoric appears to have goaded them into action. 
Likewise, if the informant had previously committed fraud or other 
crimes of dishonesty, this raises the risk that the informant lied to government 
handlers, portraying the case as more worthy of investigation and inducement 
than it really was. It also increases the possibility that the informant’s 
testimony is perjured. Several of the informants in major cases have been 
convicted for fraud (the informants Shaheed Hussain,158 Mohamed 
Alanssi,159 and Shaquille Azir,160 for example). Another informant continued 
working for the FBI even after he was found to be lying to the government 
and failed a lie detector test.161 Robert Childs, a convicted rapist and child 
molester, was hired by the FBI to serve as an informant in the cases of Abu 
Khalid Abdul-Latif and Walli Mujahidh, even though Childs had once 
allegedly stolen thousands of dollars from Abdul-Latif, and even tried to steal 
Abdul-Latif’s wife.162 Critics, such as former FBI agent Michael German, 
have noted that the informants often seem to be more dangerous than those 
they are compensated for ensnaring.163 
12. Informant-provided employment or housing. If the informant 
provided an unemployed or impoverished defendant with a job, or a homeless 
defendant with a place to stay, this increases the likelihood that the defendant 
would not have otherwise committed a terrorist offense. A penniless or 
homeless person would normally not be in a position to engage in 
terrorism.164 
 
158 United States v. Cromitie, No. 09 CR. 558 (CM), 2011 WL 1842219, at *24 (S.D.N.Y. 
May 10, 2011), aff’d, 727 F.3d 194 (2d Cir. 2013) (reviewing trial evidence about dozens of 
lies Hussain told to courts, various government agencies, his hotel customers, and the FBI). 
159 William Glaberson, Terror Case Hinges on a Wobbly Key Player, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
27, 2004, at A1 (discussing Alanssi’s fraud conviction). 
160 See Erdely, supra note 5, at 71 (discussing Azir’s history of fraud). 
161 AARONSON, supra note 19, at 61–62. 
162 Trevor Aaronson, After Child Rape Conviction, Man Became an FBI Informant and 
then Committed Crime Again in Florida, NAPLES DAILY NEWS (Dec. 29, 2014, 5:34 PM), 
http://www.naplesnews.com/news/crime/after-child-rape-conviction-man-became-an-fbi-
informant-and-then-committed-crime-again-in-florida_06700209.  
163 German, supra note 2, at 54 (“[M]any of these frightening plots were almost entirely 
concocted and engineered by the FBI itself, using corrupt agents provocateurs who often posed 
a far more serious criminal threat than the dimwitted saps the investigations ultimately 
netted.”). 
164 The Seventh Circuit’s “positional” predisposition test incorporates such factors, 
determining whether, as a practical matter, a defendant was “in a position without the 
government’s help to become involved in illegal activity.” United States v. Hollingsworth, 
27 F.3d 1196, 1200 (7th Cir. 1994). 
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In such cases, given that informants have strong incentives to help 
secure convictions, it is likely that the informant provided the job or housing 
to increase the likelihood of successfully inducing the defendant. It is also 
possible that the informant used the housing or job to manipulate the 
defendant, by threatening termination or eviction upon refusal to participate 
in the offense. 
After the defendants in the Cleveland Five case said they were not 
interested in buying bombs since they had no money, the informant gave 
them full-time jobs,165 apparently so that they could afford the explosives and 
thus participate in the informant’s plot to bomb a bridge. As mentioned 
earlier, the informant threatened to fire one of the defendants if he backed out 
of the plot.166 In another example, an informant provided Derrick Shareef, 
who was practically homeless when the two met, with a place to stay, 
enabling him to participate in a plot.167 
13. Informant use or provision of alcohol or drugs. If the informant used 
alcohol or drugs with the defendant, or provided the defendant with alcohol 
or drugs, this can suggest that the informant was attempting to render the 
defendant easier to induce, or prompt the defendant to make statements that 
could later be used as predisposition evidence.168 
In the Cleveland Five case, the informant gave the defendants large 
amounts of alcohol and illegal drugs over a significant time period.  
Specifically, the informant provided them with a constant supply of beer 
throughout the workday, and marijuana and prescription medications after 
work.169 This suggests that he was using the substances to manipulate the 
defendants or cloud their judgments. In another example, the undercover 
police officers accused of entrapping the NATO 3 repeatedly supplied them 
with alcohol, perhaps to get them talking about potential illegal plans.170 
In addition, José Pimentel, the mentally ill convert to Islam who agreed 
to construct bombs for a terrorist attack, allegedly smoked marijuana with the 
 
165 See Erdely, supra note 5, at 74. 
166 Id. at 75. 
167 See AARONSON, supra note 19, at 168; German, supra note 2, at 55. 
168 In one case, the Eighth Circuit frowned upon, without creating an explicit rule against, 
an informant’s use of marijuana with the defendant. United States v. Lard, 734 F.2d 1290, 
1297 (8th Cir. 1984) (“The government agents’ overzealous efforts to instigate crime also 
involved rather extreme and questionable measures—including the smoking of marijuana—to 
gain Lard’s confidence and lure him into committing a crime he was not otherwise ready and 
willing to commit.”). 
169 See Erdely, supra note 5, at 74.  
170 FREE THE NATO 3, supra note 113 (summarizing opening statements in the trial, which 
was held in late January 2014).  
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NYPD informant in the case.171 Some of their recorded conversations seem 
to have taken place while Pimentel was under the influence of the drug,172 
and these conversations may have created the foundation for a finding of 
predisposition. It seems questionable, to say the least, to rely on a defendant’s 
speech while he or she was intoxicated to rebut an entrapment defense, 
particularly when the informant was himself a participant in (or the instigator 
of) the drug use. 
14. Suspect evidentiary practices. If the informant or law enforcement 
engaged in a practice that seems aimed at manipulating the evidence to 
undermine an entrapment defense, this should weigh against a finding of 
predisposition. In such a case, it is often reasonable to suspect that the 
informant’s government handlers coached the informant on ways to rebut the 
entrapment defense, by pressuring the defendant to make statements or 
engage in other activities that could be later used to prove predisposition. 
Such practices, while not dispositive, are highly suspect, casting doubt on 
both the integrity of government’s prosecution of the case and the 
defendant’s predisposition.173 If the defendant was in fact predisposed to 
commit terrorist crimes, there would be no need to engage in these practices. 
When particularly serious, evidentiary manipulation might provide the 
foundation for an outrageous government conduct defense.  
In some cases, informants have engaged in rather transparent attempts 
to cultivate predisposition evidence. For example, in the Fort Dix Five case, 
which involved a plot to attack U.S. soldiers in New Jersey, the informant 
repeatedly prompted the defendants to download jihadi videos, which the 
prosecution would later use to try to indicate predisposition.174 The informant 
even provided one defendant with equipment to download the videos.175 In 
another case, the undercover FBI agent led the informants in swearing an oath 
 
171 Rashbaum & Goldstein, supra note 134 (“And Mr. Pimentel, several of the people said, 
also smoked marijuana with the confidential informant, and some recordings in which he 
makes incriminating statements were made after the men had done so.”).  
172 Id. 
173 This assumes, of course, that these tactics are more common in cases in which the 
government is concerned about an entrapment defense, rather than universally applied 
strategies. But there is no indication from our research that these practices are universal. 
174 Paul Harris, Fort Dix Five: ‘If They Did Something, Punish Them. But They’re Innocent 
Kids’, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 16, 2011, 12:34 EST), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/
nov/16/fbi-fort-dix-five (“[The defendants] also claim almost all of the jihadi videos used by 
the prosecution were downloaded at the instigation of [the informant] Omar.”). 
175 Ian Lustick, Fort Dix and Colorado: Pre-emptive Pre-emption in the War on Terror, 
PSYSR BLOG (Dec., 24, 2008), http://www.psysr.org/blog/2008/12/24/fort-dix-and-colorado-
pre-emptive-pre-emption-in-the-war-on-terror/ (mentioning that the informant provided them 
with equipment for downloading the videos). 
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to Al Qaeda. However, at least one defendant testified that he did not know 
what he was saying and did not understand the agent’s pronunciation of the 
words Al Qaeda.176  
Another critical evidentiary issue is the informant’s failure to record 
particularly important conversations, the content of which would be 
important for determining whether the informant radicalized, pressured, or 
badgered the defendant. The absence of such recordings does not prove 
nefarious motives or the presence of entrapment. But given the staggering 
amount of surveillance that is available, the failure to record the most 
important meetings raises reasonable questions about the strength of the 
government’s case. Aaronson has documented that in a number of cases, the 
initial several conversations between the informant and the defendant—when 
persuasion, radicalization, or promise of large material rewards might have 
occurred—are left unrecorded.177 As mentioned earlier, longtime FBI agent 
James Wedick has lent credence to critics’ suspicions about this practice.178 
2. The Initial Targeting of the Defendant 
15. Defendant targeted for invalid reason. If a defendant is chosen for 
inducement (whether by the government or the informant acting 
independently) for a reason that is shown to be factually incorrect, this should 
weigh in favor of entrapment or the outrageous government conduct defense. 
Many cases note that the government should not be in the business of 
tempting law-abiding citizens who are peacefully minding their own 
affairs.179 Invalid justifications for initial targeting decisions might implicate 
due process rights, if law-abiding individuals have a right not to be coaxed 
into offenses. In any case, targeting a person for an invalid reason offends the 
underlying policy concerns behind entrapment doctrine, because if there is 
 
176 Christine Kearney, U.S. Doctor Pledged to Al Qaeda for Jihad: Prosecutor, REUTERS 
(May 15, 2007), http://www.reuters.com/assets/print?aid=USN1519624120070516. 
177 AARONSON, supra note 19, at 181–99.  
178 Id. at 195. 
179 Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 441 (1932) (“It is clear that the evidence was 
sufficient to warrant a finding that the act for which defendant was prosecuted was instigated 
by the prohibition agent, that it was the creature of his purpose, that defendant had no previous 
disposition to commit it but was an industrious, law-abiding citizen, and that the agent lured 
defendant, otherwise innocent, to its commission by repeated and persistent solicitation . . . . 
Such a gross abuse of authority given for the purpose of detecting and punishing crime, and 
not for the making of criminals, deserves the severest condemnation . . . .”); United States v. 
Twigg, 588 F.2d 373, 381 (3d Cir. 1978) (“This egregious conduct on the part of government 
agents generated new crimes by the defendant merely for the sake of pressing criminal charges 
against him when, as far as the record reveals, he was lawfully and peacefully minding his 
own affairs.”). 
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no good reason for targeting an individual, this suggests that the person 
would have been unlikely to commit a similar crime on his or her own. 
As an example, the sting operation involving the loan to pizza shop 
owner Mohamed Hossain appears to have been conceived solely to target his 
imam, Kurdish refugee Yassin Aref, whose name had been found in a 
notebook in Iraq next to the work “kak.”180 In Arabic, “kak” means 
commander, ostensibly leading the FBI to suspect that Aref may have had a 
leadership role in some terrorist group.181 In fact, “kak” in Kurdish simply 
means “brother” and is commonly used as an honorific in that language.182 
No reasonable grounds for Aref’s or Hussain’s targeting have ever been 
disclosed. 
In the Lakhani case, the investigation began only because the informant, 
whom the FBI had previously labeled as “untrustworthy,” told the FBI 
outlandish lies about Lakhani’s extensive illegal arms sales, and his hundreds 
of millions of dollars of wealth.183 In fact, Lakhani was a low-income, failed 
businessman with no prior involvement in terrorism, who had only overseen 
a small number of minor—and completely legal—arms sales.184 It is difficult 
to conceive of a defensible reason for targeting such a man. 
16. Defendant targeted for protected speech. If the informant targeted a 
defendant primarily for engaging in protected speech, such as voicing support 
for some terrorist group, this raises the question of whether the informant 
persuaded the defendant to engage in terrorism even though he would have 
never done so otherwise. At least in the United States, the number of 
individuals with pro-terrorist views is far higher than the (extremely small) 
number of attacks, making the likelihood of a particular terrorism-
sympathizer committing an attack incredibly low.185 Individuals targeted 
 
180 AARONSON, supra note 19, at 121. 
181 Id. 
182 Id.; Marc Santora, Key Evidence Cast in Doubt On a Claim Of Terrorism, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 18, 2004, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/08/18/nyregion/key-evidence-
cast-in-doubt-on-a-claim-of-terrorism.html. Aref may also have been targeted because the 
government had mistaken him for an Al Qaeda member named Mohammed Yassin. See 
DOWNS & MANLEY, supra note 56, at B-7.  
183 United States v. Lakhani, 480 F.3d 171, 174, 176 (3d Cir. 2007) (noting that the 
informant had previously been “let go” from government service because he was found to be 
“untrustworthy”); AMITAVA KUMAR, A FOREIGNER CARRYING IN THE CROOK OF HIS ARM A 
TINY BOMB 37–38  (2010). 
184 Lakhani, 480 F.3d at 174 (stating that Lakhani had been engaged in legitimate arms 
deals); KUMAR, supra note 183, at 37–38, 42; Ronald Smothers, Man Pleads Not Guilty in Plot 
to Sell Missiles for Terror Use, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2004, at B6 (Lakhani’s attorney stating 
that Lakhani’s only previous arms deal involved a single armored personnel carrier). 
185 See generally United States v. Cromitie, 727 F.3d 194, 229 (2d Cir. 2013) (Jacobs, C.J., 
dissenting) (“It therefore is not enough to infer a formed design to commit an act of terror from 
2. NORRIS FINAL FOR PRINTER (CORRECTED OCT. 11) 10/11/2016  9:14 AM 
644 NORRIS & GROL-PROKOPCZYK [Vol. 105 
solely for their ideological views, with no indication they were planning a 
terrorist offense, would have been extremely unlikely to commit an attack on 
their own. Such cases thus offend the policy rationale behind the entrapment 
doctrine. 
For example, Antonio Martinez, a young convert to Islam, was 
approached by informants after making vague, militant-sounding posts on 
Facebook (which were devoid of any specific threats).186 He later agreed to 
plant a car bomb, though he first had to practice driving, with which he had 
little experience.187 Extreme political speech might, under some 
circumstances, reasonably prompt authorities to place an individual under 
surveillance. Yet it is hard to understand why such speech alone, in the 
absence of any planning or intention to engage in terrorism, merits as 
expensive and intrusive an intervention as a sting operation.188 
For this reason, being targeted for inducement solely because of 
protected speech should weigh against predisposition. In terms of the five-
factor predisposition test used by many courts, this issue could be considered 
under the “defendant’s character or reputation” factor (since one’s 
ideological sympathies can be understood as an aspect of one’s character).189 
However, targeting an individual for protected speech alone may fit more 
comfortably into the outrageous government conduct defense. This would 
particularly be the case if courts were ever to find that targeting an individual 
for inducement based on protected speech alone violates the individual’s 
constitutional rights. 
17. Defendant targeted despite lack of terrorist sympathies. In some 
cases, the defendants targeted by informants already had pro-terrorist 
views.190 However, there are a number of cases in which there is no evidence 
 
a sense of grievance or an impulse to lash out. These disquiets are common, and in most people 
will never combust.”); KURZMAN, supra note 71, at 29–35 (accounting for the low number of 
terror attacks, despite a significant amount of sympathy for some terrorists, in part with 
reference to a “radical sheik” phenomenon, analogous to the ubiquitous Che Guevara imagery, 
in which many voice support for extremist views while doing nothing about them); Norris, 
supra note 78 (arguing that a pro-terrorist sympathizer in the US who has not already begun 
to plan an attack is extremely unlikely to ever engage in terrorism).  
186 AARONSON, supra note 19, at 20. 
187 Id. at 21–22. Martinez’s lack of driving skills casts at least some doubt on his ability to 
carry out a terrorist attack without government assistance. 
188 See Arax, supra note 3, and accompanying text. 
189 This argument runs counter to the tendency of some courts to allow expressions of 
sympathy for terrorism to be the sole evidentiary basis for a jury’s finding that a person was 
predisposed beyond a reasonable doubt. Yet sympathy with terrorism alone is such a poor 
predictor of terrorist activity that it should be insufficient to establish predisposition as a matter 
of law. See generally Norris, supra note 78. 
190 Cromitie, 727 F.3d at 212; AARONSON, supra note 19, at 10, 184-85, 212. 
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at all the defendant approved of terrorism, or in which there is evidence that 
the defendant actually opposed terrorism. There is no legitimate law 
enforcement purpose for convincing a person without terrorist sympathies to 
engage in terrorism.191 The likelihood that a particular person with no history 
of involvement in terrorism, no plans to commit terrorism, and no ideological 
support for terrorism would commit a terrorist attack without government 
inducement must be infinitesimally small. Besides supporting the outrageous 
government conduct defense, this factor should weigh against, and perhaps 
preclude, a finding of predisposition, at least regarding the crime of planning 
a terrorist attack. 
In the case of Sami Hassoun, there is no indication that he ever had any 
sympathy for jihadi terrorism, before or after the informant befriended him. 
His alleged ideological motivations, which revolved around embarrassing the 
mayor of Chicago, have been aptly described as “fanciful,” and “obscure and 
unfocused.”192 Even the prosecution appeared to acknowledge his lack of 
jihadi ideology.193 Hassoun seems to have been motivated mainly by a desire 
to please the FBI informant—who had become a father figure to him—and 
to collect the “millions” of dollars promised by the informant.194 After 
Hassoun pled guilty, it was revealed that the FBI had been concerned during 
the investigation that the informant “is or is close to committing entrapment 
with Sami.”195 
Similarly, Yassin Aref and Mohammed Hossain were targeted for 
inducement despite the fact that neither ever expressed pro-terrorist views. 
On the numerous occasions that the informant mentioned violent jihad in his 
discussions with Hossain, Hossain always spoke against it.196 Aref, who had 
 
191 There is perhaps one potential exception: if someone is already well placed to help 
potential terrorists (such as a smuggler of humans or goods, a high-level drug dealer, or a 
globe-trotting arms trader), and it is important to send a message to people in such positions 
that dealing with terrorists will be caught and punished harshly. The propriety of sting 
operations in such cases may still be debatable, but that question is beyond the scope of this 
Article. See Laguardia, supra note 12, at 188 (arguing that “actual radicalization is a necessary 
aspect of involvement in terrorist activity.”).  
192 Defendant’s Sentencing Memorandum at 16, 19–20, United States v. Hassoun, No. 10-
cr-00773 (N.D. Ill. 2013). 
193 Government’s Sentencing Memorandum at 14–15, United States v. Hassoun, No. 10-
cr-00773 (N.D. Ill. 2013) (acknowledging that Hassoun lacked a jihadist motivation). 
194 Defendant’s Sentencing Memorandum, supra note 192, at 20. 
195 FBI: Informant Close to Entrapping Would-Be Bomber, AP (Feb. 4, 2013, 8:39 PM), 
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/fbi-informant-close-entrapping-would-be-bomber.  
196 Defendant’s Memorandum, United States v. Aref, No. 04-CR-402, 2007 WL 4636585 
(N.D.N.Y. 2007) (demonstrating that whenever the informant discussed terrorism, Hossain 
expressed his opposition to terrorism); United States v. Aref, No. 04-CR-402, 2007 WL 
804814, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 2007) (concluding that Hossain acted out of greed, rather 
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far less contact with the informant, also argued against terrorism when the 
informant broached the topic.197 
G. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DEFENDANT 
The three last indicators—mental illness, youth, and underachiever 
profile—are similar in that they each constitute ways in which the defendant 
may have been vulnerable to manipulation by an informant. Of course, youth 
or mental illness alone does not establish entrapment or lack of 
predisposition. As with the other indicators, the presence of these indicators 
should not be viewed as definite proof that the defendants were entrapped, 
but rather as raising the risk that entrapment-type abuses occurred. Even so, 
we acknowledge that these three indicators may be weaker predictors of the 
presence of entrapment than many of the other indicators.198 
 
than any desire to support terrorism). 
197 As Yassin Aref recounts in his book: 
Malik [the informant] secretly tape-recorded our conversations in connection with witnessing the 
loans, and he tried to draw me into general conversations about terrorism. I told him that I did not 
know anything about the organizations he claimed to support, and that I had come to this country 
to raise my family and be an Imam in peace. I said that I did not think violence would bring any 
benefit in this country, and that suicide bombing is not allowed in Islam; that Muslims in America 
should obey American law; and that if he wanted to help Muslims in foreign countries he should 
give his money to women and children who were homeless and without food or shelter, and that 
way he did not have to help terrorists or other political groups. Malik’s statements were just general 
talk, and he never gave any explanations or details about a specific plot, or asked me to participate 
in anything illegal. All of the statements, secretly recorded, are part of the record of the trial, and 
prove I did nothing wrong. 
YASSIN AREF, SON OF MOUNTAINS: MY LIFE AS A KURD AND A TERROR SUSPECT, at xiv (2008).  
198 In addition, critics might object to these indicators because mental illness, youth, or 
underachiever status might actually predict terrorist involvement. We would respond to such 
an objection as follows: While some research suggests that terrorists tend to be young, and 
that certain types of terrorists are somewhat more likely to be mentally ill or to be loners (a 
category that overlaps with that of the underachiever), the vast majority of young people, 
mentally ill people, and loners never get involved in any terrorist activity. RAMÓN SPAAIJ, 
UNDERSTANDING LONE WOLF TERRORISM 2, 50–51, 83 (2012) (noting that lone-wolf terrorists 
are relatively likely to have mental illnesses or personality disorders, or to be socially-
isolated); Gary LaFree & Gary Ackerman, The Empirical Study of Terrorism: Social and 
Legal Research, 5 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 347, 351 (2009) (indicating that terrorism is 
disproportionately perpetrated by young men). Thus, to the extent that these factors predict 
terrorism at all, they are extremely weak predictors. It is safe to say that less than one in a 
hundred thousand young people, mentally ill people, or loners in the U.S. ever come close to 
committing a terrorist attack. See infra Part V.C (concluding that only about thirty defendants 
in jihadi terrorism cases since 9/11 appear to have been real security threats); Deadly Attacks 
Since 9/11, NEW AM. FOUND., available at http://securitydata.newamerica.net/extremists/
deadly-attacks.html (listing the deadly terror attacks that have occurred since 9/11, involving 
a total of forty-three perpetrators). In contrast, if an informant persuaded a law-abiding 
individual to become involved in terrorism, the fact that the defendant was young, mentally 
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18. Mental illness. If the defendant suffers from a mental illness or 
impairment, this can potentially raise the risk of entrapment. This would be 
the case, for example, if a mental illness renders the defendant unable to 
conceive of or carry out a terrorist attack, or makes the individual more 
vulnerable to manipulation by the informant. Serious mental illness often 
impairs daily functioning to the extent that participation in planning a 
terrorist attack would not be possible. Mental illnesses and intellectual 
disabilities can also increase suggestibility,199 making it easier for informants 
to manipulate individuals to agree to participate in crimes they would not 
have committed on their own. 
As an illustration of lack of functionality, one of Cromitie’s 
codefendants, a paranoid schizophrenic from Haiti, was found with bottles of 
urine in his room, as he was too afraid to walk across the hall to use the 
restroom.200 He also believed that Florida was a foreign country, was 
described as illiterate and “mildly retarded,” and had been adjudicated too 
insane to be deported.201 It is difficult to imagine such a person either being 
recruited by a real terrorist, or committing a terrorist attack on his own. 
Several other terrorism defendants have suffered from schizophrenia or other 
major psychiatric disorders.202 
 
ill, or an underachiever significantly raises the chance that the person was easier to manipulate 
because of their vulnerable social position. As Human Rights Watch put it in its report, “While 
it is true that young men and individuals with mental or intellectual disabilities have, on 
occasion, been involved in terrorism, and therefore cannot be ruled out for investigation, there 
are special concerns when highly aggressive and invasive police tactics are used on such 
vulnerable people.” HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 54, at 56.  
199 Solomon M. Fulero & Caroline Everington, Mental Retardation, Competency to 
Waive Miranda Rights, and False Confessions, in INTERROGATIONS, CONFESSIONS AND 
ENTRAPMENT 163, 170–71 (Daniel Lassiter ed. 2004) (reviewing research demonstrating that 
mental retardation is associated with greater suggestibility); GISLI H. GUDJONSSON, THE 
PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERROGATIONS AND CONFESSIONS 372–73 (2003) (finding that paranoid 
people are more likely to comply with requests from others). 
200 Michael Wilson, In Ex-Convicts’ Bomb Case, Steps and Missteps, on Tape, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 22, 2009, at A1; Entrapment or Foiling Terror? FBI’s Reliance on Paid 
Informants Raises Questions about Validity of Terrorism Cases, DEMOCRACY NOW (Oct. 6, 
2010), www.democracynow.org/2010/10/6/entrapment_or_foiling_terror_fbis_reliance.  
201 Carrie Melago et al., Newburgh Neighbors Stunned as Cops See Enough Hate to Kill, 
N.Y. DAILY NEWS, May 22, 2009, at 5; Paul Harris, Newburgh Four: Poor, Black, and Jailed 
Under FBI ‘Entrapment’ Tactics, GUARDIAN (Dec. 12, 2011, 11:39 EST), http://www.
theguardian.com/world/2011/dec/12/newburgh-four-fbi-entrapment-terror; Graham Rayman, 
The Alarming Record of the FBI’s Informant in the Bronx Bomb Plot, VILLAGE VOICE (July 8, 
2009), http://www.villagevoice.com/news/the-alarming-record-of-the-fbis-informant-in-the-
bronx-bomb-plot-6391427. 
202 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 54, at 31 (describing Cromitie’s history of 
hallucinations, and the mental illnesses of terrorism defendants Rezwan Ferdaus, James 
Elshafay, and Jeffrey Battle); Lisa Fernandez, Documents: Alleged San Jose Bomber Suffers 
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19. Youth. If the defendant is young, this raises the question of whether 
the government took advantage of an impressionable youth.203 This is 
particularly noteworthy when the informant is considerably older, and holds 
himself out as wealthy and successful. In the case of twenty-two-year-old 
Matin Siraj, the informant was over twice Siraj’s age, described himself as a 
nuclear engineer from a prominent Egyptian family, and, as noted above, 
attempted to radicalize Siraj.204 For the purposes of coding, we classified 
anyone age twenty-four or younger as “young.” 
20. Underachiever profile. In a number of the most compelling 
examples of possible entrapment in terrorism prosecutions, the defendant fits 
a similar underachiever profile: a passive and unaccomplished man, often 
virtually penniless and living with his parents, who is befriended and then 
induced into a terrorist offense by a paid informant.205 The frequency of this 
pattern invites a reasonable suspicion that informants are targeting the most 
impressionable and weak-minded individuals for inducement, rather than 
those who are likely to commit the offense on their own.206 Judge Richard 
Posner of the Seventh Circuit, in his well-known opinion in United States v. 
Hollingsworth, described entrapment as occurring when officials “create the 
offense by exploiting the susceptibility of a weak-minded person.”207 
When the defendant’s history and behavior show him or her to be a 
passive individual with little self-initiative, or easily influenced by others, 
this should weigh in favor of entrapment, or against predisposition.208 In any 
case, if these characteristics lower the risk that the individual would ever 
 
From Mental Illness, NBC BAY AREA (Feb. 8, 2013, 5:04 PM), http://www.nbcbayarea.com/
news/local/Documents-Alleged-San-Jose-Bomber-Suffers-From-Mental-Illness-190471061. 
html. 
203 Miller v. Fenton, 796 F.2d 598, 606 (3d Cir. 1986) (noting that “a very young, 
uneducated or weak-minded” individual could be more susceptible to interrogation than a 
mature person who possesses normal intelligence and at least some secondary education); 
DAVID ALTSCHULER ET AL., CTR. FOR JUVENILE JUST. REFORM & THE JIM CASEY YOUTH 
OPPORTUNITIES INITIATIVE, SUPPORTING YOUTH IN TRANSITION TO ADULTHOOD JUSTICE 40 
(2009) (“In national opinion polls, when asked at what age children are self-sufficient, the 
average response is usually around age 24.”). 
204  BROWN, supra note 101, at 124–25; DEMOCRACY NOW, supra note 200. 
205 AARONSON, supra note 19, at 11, 234–35.  
206 United States v. Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d 1196, 1203 (7th Cir. 1994)  
207 Id. 
208 Some have suggested that a person susceptible to informant manipulation could 
potentially be recruited by real terrorists, a question that deserves in-depth scrutiny. See United 
States v. Cromitie, 727 F.3d 194, 207–08, 210 n.13 (2d Cir. 2013); see Norris, supra note 78. 
It should suffice to mention now that such a view mistakenly assumes the debatable 
proposition that real terrorists are interested in recruiting particularly passive, ineffectual and 
underachieving individuals. 
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commit an offense on his or her own, this implicates the policy rationale for 
the entrapment doctrine. 
For example, Michael Curtis Reynolds, an unemployed forty-seven-
year-old with mental problems who lived with his mother, shared his 
(unrealistic) dream of bombing the Trans-Alaska Pipeline on an internet 
forum.209 An FBI informant contacted him, offering him explosives and 
$40,000, neither of which he stood any chance of acquiring on his own.210 
III. A DATABASE OF TERRORISM PROSECUTIONS 
In order to estimate the prevalence of the entrapment indicators 
developed in Part II, this Part describes two new databases created by the 
authors. Previous databases of terrorism cases are not adequate for the 
purposes of this Article, since they are outdated and either underinclusive or 
overinclusive. One of the most comprehensive databases, including both 
convictions and open cases, was compiled by journalist Trevor Aaronson and 
others, in conjunction with the University of California-Berkeley’s 
Investigative Reporting Program.211 This database, which was published on 
the Mother Jones website, built on the DOJ’s list of terrorism-related 
convictions, adding more recent convictions that fit the DOJ’s inclusion 
criteria. The database developed for this Article builds on Mother Jones’s by 
including more recent cases, excluding cases that are unrelated or only 
loosely related to terrorism, and adding cases not originally included in the 
database. 
Mother Jones’s database ends in 2011. We updated it by conducting 
news searches for terrorism arrests in Google News and LexisNexis. This 
ensured that any terrorism prosecution that began in or after 2011 would be 
included, as long as it was covered in at least one story in the news media. 
We also drew on more recent lists of terror attacks and convictions, such as 
those by the New America Foundation and Charles Kurzman, to avoid 
missing any cases.212 The advantage of using the New America Foundation’s 
database is that, unlike Mother Jones’s, it included cases of right-wing 
terrorism. However, we excluded those cases in the New America 
Foundation’s database in which the alleged perpetrator died before being 
 
209 AARONSON, supra note 19, at 9–11. 
210 Id. 
211 See Aaronson, supra note 34. 
212 Homegrown Extremism, 2001–2015, NEW AM. FOUND., http://securitydata.
newamerica.net/extremists/analysis.html; Charles Kurzman, Muslim-American Terrorism, 
CHARLES KURZMAN, http://kurzman.unc.edu/muslim-american-terrorism/ (last visited Feb. 23, 
2015). 
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prosecuted for the offense. Successful attacks were included, as long as the 
defendant survived the attack and was charged with an offense. 
We excluded a number of cases that were included in the Mother Jones 
database. Since that database built on the DOJ’s list of terrorism-related 
cases, it includes numerous cases with no apparent connection to terrorism, 
or which are only loosely or speculatively related. The DOJ even classified a 
case in which the defendants stole a truck full of corn flakes as terrorism-
related, perhaps based on an initial belief in the investigation that the 
defendants (who have Arabic names) may have had some connection to 
terrorism.213 
Such cases were not included in our database, since the purpose of the 
database is to analyze terrorism convictions and prosecutions in progress, 
rather than any cases with speculative or tangential connections to terrorism. 
However, if an individual was charged with a terrorism offense but ultimately 
was only convicted of a nonterrorism crime, the individual was included in 
the database. Serious crimes apparently motivated by radical ideologies, such 
as attacks on police by antigovernment extremists, are included as well, even 
if authorities did not charge the individual with an offense containing the 
word “terrorism.” 
The reason for this is that the database is meant to include all cases 
involving crimes that fall within current definitions of terrorism, regardless 
of whether the specific charges contained references to terrorism as such.214 
A prosecutor may decide whether to employ a terrorism statute, as opposed 
to other statutes covering the same crime (such as arson or murder statutes), 
based on a number of considerations, such as the perceived seriousness of the 
crime, the desired sentence, the predicted difficulty of proving the elements 
of the offense, or a personal belief that a particular type of crime deserves to 
 
213 Profiles: Hussein Abuali, MOTHER JONES, http://www.motherjones.com/fbi-terrorist/
hussein-abuali-stolen-cereal (last visited Feb. 23, 2015); see Laguardia, supra note 12, at 201 
(“One audit found that almost no statistics compiled by DOJ’s offices in regards to terrorism 
investigations had been compiled accurately. The audit found that the DOJ had massively 
under-reported the number of terrorism cases filed in 2002, while over-reporting (by 
approximately 50%) the number of cases filed in 2003 and 2004. Similar mistakes were found 
in the reporting of convictions and prosecutions in 2003 and 2004.”). 
214 To accommodate the varying definitions of terrorism, cases were included in the 
database if they involved serious violent or property crimes committed for ideological reasons. 
This definition encompasses various crimes often described as terrorism in contemporary 
society, from environmentally motivated arsons to anti-abortion killings. By defining and 
using the term in this way, we are not necessarily endorsing the use of the term terrorism to 
describe all of these crimes. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.  
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be called terrorism.215 Omitting cases in which prosecutors did not employ 
terrorism statutes would arbitrarily restrict the scope of the database. 
We also added a number of cases that were not in the DOJ’s original list 
and thus were also missing from the Mother Jones database. Curiously, 
although the government has commonly labeled actions carried out by 
Animal Liberation Front and Earth Liberation Front as “ecoterrorism,”216 
ALF- and ELF-related convictions do not appear in the DOJ’s database. The 
same is true for other convictions often portrayed as terrorism but which 
pertain to left-wing or right-wing activists, rather than Muslims or other 
members of minority groups. These include, for example, cases in which 
activists protesting the Republican National Convention in Minnesota were 
threatened with terrorism charges for building and planning to use Molotov 
cocktails. Numerous cases of right-wing domestic terrorism associated with 
antigovernment militias and white supremacist groups, none of which 
appeared on the DOJ’s list, were also included in our database. 
In short, the full database includes all terrorism cases in the thirteen 
years since 9/11, regardless of the type of ideological motivation, while 
excluding cases with no direct connection to terrorism.217 A total of 580 cases 
were identified meeting these criteria. The purpose of compiling a 
comprehensive database, rather than focusing solely on cases involving 
informants or undercover agents, is to produce a useful portrait of the entire 
field of terrorism cases. Among other things, this enables us to determine 
what proportion of the prosecutions involved an informant or undercover 
agent. 
To apply the twenty entrapment indicators, we created a smaller 
database comprised only of those cases in which an informant or undercover 
agent played a role (n=317). In creating this database, we excluded cases in 
which an informant interacted with the defendant, or reported a tip to law 
enforcement, only after the offense had already been committed. Such cases 
might still be problematic for some reason—for example, a defendant might 
falsely claim to an informant that he committed some offense, leading to his 
 
215 For example, although Timothy McVeigh bombed a federal building with an 
ideological motive, one homeland security official opined that McVeigh was not a terrorist. 
POTTER, supra note 24, at 47. More generally, the government seems less inclined to label 
right-wing extremists as terrorists. Id. at 44–47.  
216 The Threat of Eco-terrorism: Testimony Before the Subcomm. on Forests and Forest 
Health of the H. Resources Comm., 107th Cong. (2002) (testimony of James F. Jarboe, 
Domestic Terrorism Section Chief, FBI), available at http://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/the-
threat-of-eco-terrorism. 
217 Cases initiated in the court system after September 11, 2014 were not included.  
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prosecution—but not on account of entrapment or outrageous government 
conduct. 
In order to code the cases, we reviewed court filings, court decisions, 
legal briefs, news articles, and any other available information regarding each 
case. Based on this information, we determined whether each indicator 
applied to the case, using the criteria for each indicator presented in Appendix 
A. It was not feasible to confine our analysis to facts that were proven at trial 
or through other official documentation, since few of these cases went to trial 
or have complete records available to the public. 
Because some of these allegations may have been untrue or exaggerated, 
this coding methodology may overstate somewhat the presence of these 
indicators. However, this method is most consistent with the purpose of this 
project, which is to provide an estimation of the overall scale of potential 
entrapment abuses. It is also possible that the results understate the 
prevalence of the entrapment indicators, since in many of the cases, there is 
little or no information available regarding the role of the informant in the 
offense. 
IV. RESULTS 
This Part briefly describes the content of the database of post-9/11 
terrorism prosecutions, and presents findings about the prevalence of the 
twenty indicators in those cases in which an informant or undercover agent 
played a role. 
A. AN OVERVIEW OF THE DATABASE: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Types of terrorism offenses. The full database of post-9/11 terrorism 
prosecutions contains a total of 580 cases. Table 1 shows the relative 
frequency of each type of terrorist offense. The cases under “plotting a 
specific terrorist attack” exclude successful and attempted attacks. Attempted 
attacks do not include sting operations. 
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Table 1 
Types of Terrorism Offenses in Post-9/11 Terrorism Cases (n=580) 
Type of Terrorism Offense Percentage of Cases 
Plotting a specific terrorist attack 29% 
Successful attack  18% 
Sending money or other items to terrorists 16% 
Traveling abroad to join a terrorist group 9% 
Other material support 8% 
Training for terrorism on U.S. soil 7% 
Arms transactions with terrorist groups 6% 
Training for terrorism at foreign camp 5% 
Involvement in terrorism abroad 4% 
Drug transactions with terrorist groups 3% 
Attempted attack 2% 
Note: Total exceeds 100% due to rounding and presence of more than one type 
of charge in some cases. 
 
Ideological motivations. Table 2 summarizes the religious or political 
ideologies motivating the 580 terrorism cases in the database. The largest 
proportion of cases (338 or 58%) involved jihadi terrorism. The second 
largest group (149 or 26%) involved right-wing terrorists, including neo-
Nazis and other white supremacists, members of antigovernment militias, 
adherents of “patriot” or “sovereign citizen” ideology, and anti-abortion 
extremists.218 Forty-four (8%) of cases were motivated by animal rights, 
environmental, or left-wing ideology. Twenty-eight (5%) concerned 
Colombian terrorist groups, with three-quarters of these offenses involving 
Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), and the remaining 
quarter related to right-wing paramilitaries designated as terrorist 
organizations under American law. Eighteen (3%) of the cases involved 




218 In addition, two defendants were associated with the Jewish Defense League, which 
we include in the right-wing category because of its nationalistic orientation. 
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Table 2 
Ideological Motivations in Post-9/11 Terrorism Cases (n=580) 





South Asian/East Asian-related  3% 
 
The Use of Informants or Undercover Agents. Three hundred and 
seventeen (55%) of the cases involved an informant or undercover agent 
before or during the commission of the crime. All of these cases are included 
in the smaller database. 
B. INDICATORS IN THE CASES WITH INFORMANTS OR AGENTS  
Zero-scoring cases. Fifty-three of the 317 cases involving informants or 
government agents are not coded for any of the indicators of entrapment 
(“zero-scoring cases”). In many cases, this was because of a dearth of 
information on the role of the informant in the case. In other cases, this was 
due to the rather minor role of the informant. For example, the informant’s 
role was sometimes limited to communicating a tip to the authorities. In most 
of the analyses below, the zero-scoring cases are excluded, in order to focus 
on cases with sufficient information and nontrivial informant involvement.219 
However, statistics including zero-scoring cases are regularly provided in the 
text, in order to display the findings for the entire informant-related database. 
Average number of indicators. Table 3 shows the average number of 
indicators of entrapment by ideological type of terrorism (with zero-scoring 
cases removed). The average number of indicators per case, overall, is 5.3. 
To break this down by ideological type, those accused of jihadi terrorism had 
an average of 6.3 indicators, alleged right-wing terrorists averaged 2.8, left-
wing defendants averaged 10.2, Colombia-related defendants averaged 5.0, 
and alleged Asian terrorists had an average score of 2.1. (With the zero-
scoring cases included, these averages are reduced to 4.4 for the whole 
database, 5.1 for jihadi cases, and 2.2 for right-wing cases.) 
 
219 It could be that the zero-scoring cases represent examples of informants being used 
appropriately. However, it is also possible that, if more information about the zero-scoring 
cases were available, these cases would on average score higher than the other cases, 
increasing the overall average number of indicators per case. It is thus unknown whether 
additional information about these cases would increase or decrease estimates of the strength 
of entrapment claims in the cases. 
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Confining the analysis to those cases in which there were specific plots 
to commit a terrorist attack, the average score is 8.1 for jihadi terrorism, 2.9 
for the right-wing plots, and 10.2 for the leftist plots.220 This suggests that, 
for jihadi terrorism cases, the more serious cases were more likely to involve 
entrapment or borderline entrapment. The difference in the average score 
between jihadi cases not involving plots (5.2) and jihadi cases involving plots 
(8.1) is statistically significant  (two-tailed t-test; p < .0001).221 
The two right-most columns in Table 3 show the average number of the 
core six indicators of entrapment (i.e., those at the core of prevailing 
entrapment doctrine) for all cases and for plots only. Whether focusing on all 
twenty indicators or only the core six, jihadi and left-wing cases featured a 
higher number of indicators than other cases. Because of the relative lack of 
information about many of the Asian, Colombian, and right-wing 
prosecutions, it is possible that this does not reflect underlying differences in 
the actual presence of entrapment abuses. Future work should analyze in 
more depth whether particular categories of terrorism appear to have more 
allegations of egregious abuses. 
 
Table 3 
Average Number of Entrapment Indicators by Ideological Type (n=264) 
 High-scoring cases. The case with the most entrapment indicators, that 
of Sami Hassoun, had fifteen of the twenty indicators. Overall, 36 (14%) of 
the cases (or 11% if the zero-scoring are included) had ten or more indicators. 
Ninety-eight (37%) had seven or more indicators (31% including zero-
 
220 There are no zero-scoring cases among the left-wing, Asian, or Colombian cases. None 
of the Asian or Colombian cases involved plots, as that term is used in this Article. 
221 The same is true for the difference in mean indicators between plot (6.3 indicators) and 











of Core Six 
Indicators 
Average # 
of Core Six 
Indicators, 
Plots Only 
Jihadi 6.3 8.1 2.9 3.4 
Right-wing 2.8 3.0 1.3 1.4 
Left-wing 10.2 10.2 4.0 4.0 
Colombian 5.0     N/A 3.0        N/A 
Asian 2.1     N/A 1.0        N/A 
All combined  5.3 6.3 2.5 2.6 
Note: Zero-scoring cases were excluded. 
 
2. NORRIS FINAL FOR PRINTER (CORRECTED OCT. 11) 10/11/2016  9:14 AM 
656 NORRIS & GROL-PROKOPCZYK [Vol. 105 
scoring cases). It should be noted that 75% of the indicators for all the cases 
came from the first ten, case-law-derived indicators. 
A more conservative estimate of potential entrapment would rely only 
on the six indicators at the core of entrapment doctrine.222 The average 
number of core indicators by ideological type was presented in Table 3, and 
the prevalence of each of the six core indicators is shown in Table 4. The low 
percentage of cases coded for reluctance was due to the lack of specific facts 
in most cases about the defendant’s reluctance per se. In contrast, there was 
often more ample information regarding the informant’s efforts to pressure 
or persuade the defendant. Realistically, in any case in which pressure or 
persuasion was necessary, some degree of reluctance must have been present 
as well. Nonetheless, we only coded for reluctance when there were specific 
facts indicating a defendant’s reticence to participate in (or attempt to back 
out of) a plot. 
 
Table 4 
Percentage of Cases with Each of the Core Six Entrapment Indicators 
(n=264) 
Core Six Entrapment Indicators % of All Cases with the 
Indicator 
1 No previous terrorism offenses or activity 63% 
2 Government proposed the crime 50% 
3 Informant pressure or persuasion 39% 
4 Material incentive 31% 
5 Defendant’s reluctance 13% 
6 Governmental control of the crime 51% 
Note: Zero-scoring cases were excluded. 
 
Additional data on the prevalence of the six core indicators are 
summarized in Table 5, in order to illustrate the number of cases with several 
of the core indicators. As shown, 50% of all cases had three or more of the 
core indicators, and 35% had four or more. (These figures drop to 41% and 
29%, respectively, if zero-scoring cases are included.) For the jihadi cases, 
62% had three or more core indicators (excluding zero-scoring cases). 
Analyzing only cases involving specific plots to commit terrorist attacks 
(and excluding zero-scoring cases), 75% of jihadi cases have three or more 
of the core six indicators, 13% of the right-wing cases had three or more, and 
 
222 Factors 1–6 are the factors most commonly used by courts employing the prevailing 
subjective entrapment standard. 
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100% of left-wing cases had three or more.223 Fifty-one percent of the jihadi 
cases involving plots had four or more of the core six, and 62% of the left-
wing cases (in all of which the defendants were charged with plotting attacks) 
had four or more.224 
 
Table 5 























Jihadi 62% 75% 47% 51% 
Right-wing 11% 13% 11% 13% 
Left-wing 100% 100% 62% 62% 
Colombian 70% N/A 22% N/A 
Asian 5% N/A 0% N/A 
All combined 50% 53% 35% 36% 
Note: Zero-scoring cases were excluded. 
 
An additional analysis that excludes well-known cases is also useful for 
advancing the argument of this Article that entrapment indicators are 
widespread among the cases, rather than being confined to a small number of 
extreme cases. Accordingly, Table 6 presents selected statistics comparing 
famous and non-famous cases. The most famous cases, most often cited as 
possible examples of entrapment, include the cases of James Cromitie,225 
Hamid Hayat,226 Hemant Lakhani,227 the Fort Dix Five,228 the Liberty City 
Seven,229 and Yassin Aref and Mohammed Hossain.230 
 
223 When zero-scoring plots are included, the percentages drop to 68% of jihadi cases and 
11% of right-wing cases. 
224 With zero-scoring cases included, the percentages decrease to 46% of jihadi cases and 
11% of right-wing cases. 
225 See supra text accompany notes 7–11. 
226 See supra text accompanying notes 94–95. 
227 See Bartosiewicz, supra note 127.  
228 See Harris, supra note 174.  
229 See AARONSON, supra note 19, at 74–75, 83; Aaronson, supra note 34; Goudie supra 
note 146. 
230 See supra text accompanying notes 180–82.  
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These cases comprise twenty-two defendants, or 12% of the defendants 
accused of jihadi terrorism in cases involving informants. The famous cases 
average several more indicators than non-famous cases (11.1 versus 5.5), and 
they are much more likely to have three or more or four or more of the core 
six indicators (with all such differences statistically significant; p =< .0001, 
two-tailed). However, the famous cases do not represent most or all of the 
high-scoring cases: 70% of the cases with four or more of the core six 
indicators are not famous cases, and 77% of the cases with three or more of 
the core six indicators are not famous. Thus, a substantial majority of the 
highest-scoring cases are not well-known cases. 
 
Table 6 
Entrapment Indicators for Famous and Non-Famous Jihadi Cases (n=153) 
Type of Case Average # 
of All 
Indicators 
% of Cases 
with Three or 
More Core 
Indicators 
% of Cases 
with Four or 
More Core 
Indicators 
Famous jihadi cases  11.1 100% 95% 
Non-famous jihadi cases 5.5 56% 39% 
All jihadi cases 6.3 62% 47% 
  Note: Zero-scoring cases were excluded. 
V. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
A. NUMBER OF INDICATORS PER CASE 
The cases with the highest number of indicators have the greatest 
probability of involving entrapment, given the allegations about government 
or informant conduct in the case. However, it is also possible that some cases 
have relatively few indicators and yet present persuasive entrapment claims. 
In addition, some cases would likely have scored higher on the scale if more 
information had been available for this study. For example, if a defendant 
pleads guilty, the details of government inducement may never become 
public. There might also be cases in which the informant exerted an 
enormous amount of pressure on the defendant, but in which few of the other 
indicators are present. This does not mean it is a weak case: a single indicator 
alone could justify a finding of entrapment or outrageous government 
conduct, depending on the circumstances of the case. 
Michael C. Reynolds’s case scored for a moderate six indicators (and 
only two of the core six indicators), but the man’s personal background—an 
unemployed loner, living with his parents, with a history of mental 
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problems—makes it very unlikely that he could have been resourceful 
enough to go through with his desire (stated in an online chatroom) to bomb 
the Trans-Alaska Pipeline, without an informant providing him with the 
means for the attack.231 Despite the moderate number of indicators and his 
preexisting desire to commit an attack, it seems highly doubtful that the sting 
operation actually prevented a terrorist attack from occurring. 
That said, this case appears less egregious than some other, higher-
scoring cases (such as those of Cromitie,232 Hassoun,233 Hayat,234 and 
Shareef235), in which the government’s role in persuading or pressuring the 
defendant was much more extensive. Thus, while the moderate number of 
indicators may understate the degree to which the Reynolds case violates the 
policies underlying the entrapment defense, it appropriately serves to 
distinguish the case from more extreme cases. 
It is also possible that there are cases with many indicators that are not 
problematic. It could be that, despite a large number of indicators, some 
aspect of the case suggests that the defendant would have likely committed 
an attack on his own if he had not been ensnared by an informant. In addition, 
if the allegations or testimony relevant to the entrapment indicators are 
exaggerated or untrue in a particular case, this would probably indicate the 
absence of entrapment. However, we did not identify any clearly 
unproblematic cases with numerous indicators.236 
It should be emphasized again that this indicator analysis is not meant 
to prove or reliably predict whether a particular case in fact involves 
entrapment or outrageous government conduct or whether it violates the 
policies underlying these doctrines. Making such a determination would only 
be possible through an in-depth examination of the facts of the case, as 
proven by reliable evidence. The purpose of this study is rather to provide an 
estimate, in the aggregate, of what proportion of cases involve facts or 
allegations that would support an entrapment or outrageous government 
conduct defense, or increase the likelihood that entrapment or outrageous 
government conduct occurred. 
 
231 See AARONSON, supra note 19, at 9–11. He was scored for indicators one, six, seven, 
eight, eighteen, and twenty. 
232 See supra text accompany notes 7–11.  
233 See supra note 192–195.  
234 See supra text accompanying notes 94–95.  
235 See supra text accompanying notes 97–99.  
236 As noted below, there is one case with a moderate number of indicators that seems 
relatively likely to have involved a true security threat. See infra note 244 and accompanying 
text. 
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B. THE PREVALENCE OF ENTRAPMENT, BORDERLINE-ENTRAPMENT, 
AND OUTRAGEOUS GOVERNMENT CONDUCT 
As shown in Part IV using a variety of measures, a significant proportion 
of all post-9/11 terrorism cases have numerous entrapment indicators. Jihadi 
and left-wing cases on average have more indicators than other categories. 
For jihadi cases, actual terrorist plots scored significantly higher than non-
plot offenses, suggesting that high-profile, serious cases of jihadi terrorism 
are more likely than other cases to involve entrapment or outrageous 
government conduct. The vast majority of jihadi and left-wing cases 
featuring plots had three or more of the core six indicators of entrapment. 
While the most famous cases tend to have more indicators, the majority of 
high-scoring cases are non-famous cases. 
These findings demonstrate that facts and allegations raising the 
probability of entrapment or outrageous government conduct are not limited 
to the small handful of cases that have gotten the most attention in the popular 
media and academia. Instead, these indicators, including those most central 
to courts’ entrapment analysis, are widespread among jihadi and left-wing 
cases generally. 
C. HOW MANY POST-9/11 TERRORISM CASES ARE “REAL”? 
What of the claim that only 1% of terrorism cases are “real”? The 1% 
figure comes from Holland’s interpretation of Aaronson’s claim that only 
about five of the five hundred terrorism cases since 9/11 involved a real plot 
by people connected to genuine international terrorists, as opposed to sting 
operations or cases peripherally related to terrorism.237 He names the Zazi 
plot, the attempted Times Square bombing, the underwear bomber, the shoe 
bomber, and Jose Padilla.238 Aaronson may not have meant to suggest that 
only these five cases truly represented a significant public safety threat, but 
many readers will likely take it to mean precisely that. It is worth taking this 
idea seriously, given both the high prevalence of informant-led terrorist plots, 
and the public policy implications of heavy counterterrorism spending, if 
there are so few “real” plots stopped by the authorities. 
 
237 See Holland, supra note 20. It should be noted that in our full database, which excludes 
cases only speculatively related to terrorism, 77% of the jihadi cases did not involve plots to 
commit attacks, and instead represented other terrorist offenses such as terror fundraising or 
attempts to join terrorist groups. Though these offenses generally have less serious public 
safety implications than terrorist plots, they still have a connection to terrorism. Thus, they 
might plausibly be described as “real” terrorism offenses, at least to the extent they were not 
instigated by informants targeting individuals who would have never committed a terror 
offense on their own. 
238 Id. See AARONSON, supra note 19, at 30–31, 91–92.  
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We now evaluate the idea that there are only a handful of serious public 
safety threats among post-9/11 prosecutions of jihadi terrorism, by reviewing 
the plots involving informants that had few or no indicators, and the plots 
that did not involve informants.239 
The plots named by Aaronson may well be the most serious ones and 
the only ones closely connected with international terrorism. However, in our 
assessment, several other terrorism prosecutions appear likely to have 
stopped real terrorist plots, or at least to have potentially stopped real plots. 
First, there are a small number of apparently real plots among the 
informant cases that had two or fewer indicators. Christopher Paul, Iyman 
Faris, and Nuradin Abdi did appear to be genuinely involved in terrorism, 
including specific plots.240 Colleen LaRose and her associates seem to have 
been independently plotting to assassinate the Danish cartoonist responsible 
for a drawing of the prophet Mohammed, even if it is unclear how advanced 
or realistic their planning was.241 
 An additional low-scoring plot involving informants might have 
represented a real threat, but it is more questionable. The supposed plot to 
attack the Quantico military base by Daniel Patrick Boyd may have only 
existed in the conversations between Boyd and a government informant.242 
However, if the informant did not initiate the plot, and Boyd was speaking 
truthfully when he told the informant that Hysen Sherifi was in on the plot, 
then it is conceivable that the prosecution prevented a real attack.243 Yet the 
extensive involvement of informants in the case makes it difficult to tell 
whether any plot would have existed without them. 
Among the plots with a moderate number of indicators, our review of 
available evidence identifies only one defendant who seems somewhat likely 
 
239 Right-wing terrorism cases are excluded from this analysis, because less information 
is often available about those cases and because jihadi terrorism was the focus of the 
statements by Holland and Aaronson.  However, from our initial impression of the data, it 
seems that a larger proportion of the right-wing cases involved real threats. This is to be 
expected, given the much lower average number of indicators. It is thus possible that a number 
of real terrorist attacks by right-wing terrorists were prevented. A detailed analysis of this 
question would be a promising topic for future research. 
240 Mother Jones Report Scrubs Facts of Terrorists’ Predisposition, INVESTIGATIVE 
PROJECT ON TERRORISM (Aug. 25, 2011), http://www.investigativeproject.org/3125/mother-
jones-report-scrubs-facts-of-terrorists.  
241 Indictment, United States v. LaRose, 2:10-cr-00123-PBT (E.D. Pa. 2010). Although 
informants did play some role in the case, we were not able to find reference to any allegations 
that the informant invented or pushed along the plot. 
242 FBI Informant Says Triangle Terrorist Cell Leader Intent on Jihad, WRAL (Sept. 21, 
2011), http://www.wral.com/news/local/story/10163920/.  
243 Id.  
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to have been plotting a terrorist attack before coming into contact with an 
informant.244 As part of Nafis’s plea agreement, he admitted that he came to 
the United States with the purpose of committing violent jihad, and the 
complaint describes him trying to recruit someone into a terrorist plot before 
any informant entered the scene.245 If these statements are true, the Nafis sting 
operation may have stopped Nafis from committing a real terrorist attack, if 
he would have managed on his own to recruit others as needed for the plot, 
and to acquire the materials necessary to carry it out. When he was 
approached by informants, his planning was still at an early stage, and he did 
not have the resources to carry out an attack. 
Several plots not involving informants represented apparently credible 
threats thwarted by the government. Naser Jason Abdo, a former Army 
soldier, was arrested with numerous bomb-making ingredients and appeared 
far along in a plot to target American soldiers near Fort Hood, Texas.246 
Khalid Aldawsari also seems to have been close to completing a bomb, even 
if he had not settled on specific plans to use it.247 Ahmed Omar Abu Ali was 
convicted for plotting attacks against the United States, but the case has been 
clouded by allegations of torture by his Saudi interrogators.248 Although 
Abdurahman Alamoudi pled guilty to lesser charges, the government 
continued to allege that he participated in a Libyan conspiracy to assassinate 
the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia.249 Mohammed Jabarah, an Al Qaeda 
 
244 It is interesting to note that even in a case such as that of Amine El-Khalifi, who was 
unusual in that he agreed to carry out a suicide bomb attack, it is impossible to say whether he 
was already pursuing terrorism before informants and government agents became involved, 
because the FBI does not seem to have disclosed anything about his behavior before that time. 
Complaint, United States v. Khalifi, No. 1:12-MJ-87, 2012 WL 517540 (E.D. Va. Feb. 17, 
2012). Although this case may have prevented a real terrorist attack, it is not included on the 
list, because of the lack of information about the role of the informant and the defendant’s 
plans prior to meeting the informant.  
245 Press Release, FBI, New York Man Pleads Guilty to Attempting to Bomb New York 
Federal Reserve Bank in Lower Manhattan (Feb. 7, 2013), available at http://www.fbi.gov/
newyork/press-releases/2013/new-york-man-pleads-guilty-to-attempting-to-bomb-new-york-
federal-reserve-bank-in-lower-manhattan.  
246 Yochi J. Dreazen, Thwarted Fort Hood Terror Attack Raises New Questions About 
Radicalism Within Military, NAT’L J. (July 28, 2011), http://www.nationaljournal.com/
nationalsecurity/thwarted-fort-hood-terror-attack-raises-new-questions-about-radicalism-
within-military-20110728.  
247 James C. McKinley, Jr. & Sarah Wheaton, Saudi Student to Be Arraigned in Bomb 
Plot, N.Y TIMES, Feb. 25, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/26/us/26texas.html. 
248 United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210, 238 (4th Cir. 2008); The Trial of Ahmed Abu 
Ali - Findings of Amnesty International’s Trial Observation, AMNESTY INT’L (Dec. 14, 2005), 
http://web.archive.org/web/20070617045947/http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engamr51
1922005. 
249 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Abdurahman Alamoudi Sentenced to Jail in 
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member who worked briefly as a double-agent for the United States, appears 
to have been plotting the murder of several American agents when he was 
last arrested.250 The 2005 Los Angeles bomb plot, involving four men who 
had converted to Islam in prison, also seems to have been a potential threat, 
though it was stopped at an early stage—they had not yet acquired 
explosives, and the ringleader was in prison the entire duration of the plot.251 
It is also possible that the prosecution of Zacarias Moussaoui prevented a 
terrorist attack, if Moussaoui’s claims are to be believed. According to him, 
he was not involved in planning the 9/11 attacks as alleged, but rather was 
planning another Al Qaeda attack intended to take place after 9/11.252 
Added to the five “real” threats identified by Aaronson, this amounts to 
total of sixteen threats at least somewhat likely to have been thwarted by the 
government’s counterterrorism prosecutions. A total of thirty-one defendants 
were involved in these cases, amounting to approximately 9% of all jihadi 
terrorism defendants since 9/11 and 5% of the jihadi defendants in cases 
involving informants.253  
 As for the rest of the defendants in jihadi cases involving informants, 
the offenses seemed to have been so dependent on informants that it is 
unlikely that the plots would have existed without them. Of course, it is not 
outside the realm of possibility that some of these defendants might have 
committed acts of terror on their own, if informants had not induced them to 
do so—though it seems unlikely, given the extreme rarity of terrorist 
attacks.254 The likelihood of this possibility, and the question of whether it 
justifies the practice of using informants to induce suspects to commit 
terrorist offenses, should be addressed by future research.255 
 
Terrorism Financing Case (Oct. 15, 2004), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2004/
October/04_crm_698.htm. 
250 David B. Caruso, Terrorist Gets Life in Embassy Plot, USA TODAY (Jan. 19, 2008, 
5:45 AM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2008-01-18-688255685_x.htm.  
251 Andrew Murr, Guilty Plea in Terror Case, NEWSWEEK (Dec. 14, 2007, 7:00 PM), 
http://www.newsweek.com/guilty-plea-terror-case-95253.  
252 Defendant’s Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea, United States v. Moussaoui, No. 01-455-
A, 2002 WL 1987964 (E.D. Va. 2006). 
253 Of these 31 defendants’ cases, 10 featured informants or undercover agents. Twenty-
four of the defendants were allegedly involved in a plot, as this Article employs the term. 
These 24 defendants encompass 31% of all jihadi defendants in cases involving plots.  
254 See Anya Bernstein, The Hidden Costs of Terrorist Watch Lists, 61 BUFF. L. REV. 461, 
478 (2013) (“Given the practical difficulties of launching a terrorist attack, a person who is 
incorrectly identified as innocuous [for the purposes of the terrorist watch list], despite having 
the propensity to commit a violent act, is still quite likely never to do so.”). 
255 See generally Norris, supra note 78. It is also possible that some of the defendants 
engaged in behavior prior to the involvement of an informant that indicated that they were 
likely to carry out an attack, but that the government failed to make the information public for 
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In short, our estimate of the percentage of “real” terrorism cases (i.e., 
those representing genuine threats) is substantially higher than Holland’s. 
Nonetheless, Holland and Aaronson’s overall conclusions have merit. The 
small number of genuine terrorist threats and attacks stands in sharp contrast 
to the large number of informant-led prosecutions—prosecutions whose 
value in enhancing national security is speculative at best, and highly dubious 
in a significant proportion of cases. 
D. ENTRAPMENT AMONG THE HIGHEST-PROFILE TERRORISM CASES 
Another way of illustrating the significance of this Article’s indicators 
analysis is to apply it to published lists of the most high-profile terrorism 
cases. The Heritage Foundation, a prominent conservative think tank, 
released a list of sixty terrorist attacks and thwarted terrorist plots.256 Four of 
these involved foreign court systems, rather than U.S. courts; nine were based 
on real or attempted attacks; two led to no arrests; and one involved a military 
tribunal rather than the regular U.S. court system.257 Among the remaining 
forty-four, ten were not plots, as this Article uses the term, but were other 
types of terrorism offenses, involving such things as sending money to a 
terrorist group or attending a terrorist training camp abroad.258 
Of the remaining thirty-four cases, ten overlap with the plots identified 
above as being potentially real threats.259 The average number of indicators 
for the remaining twenty-four cases is 9.2, suggesting that many of these 
cases are highly problematic. Eighty-two percent of the forty-four defendants 
in these twenty-four cases had seven or more indicators of entrapment, and 
50% had ten or more. Eighty-six percent had three or more of the core six 
indicators, and 61% had four of more of the core six. 
Thus, a sizable proportion of cases promoted as noteworthy plots 
thwarted by counterterrorism authorities in fact show numerous indicators of 
entrapment. This suggests that such lists of “plots” should be regarded with 
skepticism, since only a small proportion of cases in this list appear to 
correspond with real threats of terrorist attacks, as opposed to plots driven by 
informants or less serious terrorism-related offenses. 
 
some reason. Yet it is hard to imagine why such information would not be disclosed, since it 
would strengthen the case and undermine an entrapment defense. 
256 Jessica Zuckerman et al., 60 Terrorist Plots Since 9/11: Continued Lessons in Domestic 
Counterterrorism, HERITAGE FOUND. (July 22, 2013), http://www.heritage.org/research/
reports/2013/07/60-terrorist-plots-since-911-continued-lessons-in-domestic-
counterterrorism. 
257 Id.  
258 Id. 
259 Id. 
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E. COUNTERTERRORISM POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
The results of this study, and other available data, suggest that the FBI 
should implement broad reforms to its counterterrorism strategies. This 
should involve a focus on passive surveillance rather than actively instigating 
plots, and at least some shift toward greater attention to the threat of right-
wing terrorism. 
In particular, the fact that post-9/11 operations have been directed so 
overwhelmingly at Muslims is problematic, given the comparative statistics 
on the characteristics and casualties caused by different types of terrorists. A 
recent study by the New America Foundation found that forty-eight people 
were killed by right-wing terrorists since 9/11, while forty-five have been 
killed by jihadi terrorists.260 The study also found that only 6% of the jihadists 
charged with terrorism offenses since 9/11 had carried out a violent attack 
before their arrest, while 48% of the right-wing terrorists had done so.261 
Moreover, only 42% of jihadis acquired a weapon before their arrest, while 
89% of the right-wing terrorists possessed weapons (often many of them) 
when apprehended.262 
In terms of entrapment, alleged right-wing terrorists in this study tended 
to have few if any indicators, with the exception of at most four plots. This 
suggests that the government uses informants much less consistently and 
aggressively against right-wing extremists than against Muslims. It might 
also mean that a larger proportion of right-wing terrorism cases were genuine 
threats, as opposed to plots whose creation and execution would have been 
unlikely without government intervention. 
In light of this information and the findings of this Article, the FBI 
should reconsider its emphasis on targeting law-abiding Muslims for 
inducement by informants. Instead, federal officials should shift 
counterterrorism resources at least to some extent toward right-wing groups, 
and focus on passive surveillance of potential terrorism suspects (to the 
extent it is legal), rather than active encouragement of terrorist plots. The 
chance of a particular terrorism sympathizer committing an attack is so small 
that convictions resulting from plots made possible by informants are 
exceedingly unlikely to provide any public safety benefit. As others have 
noted, the focus on instigating plots could even reduce public safety, if funds 
 
260 NEW AM. FOUND., supra note 198. 
261 Type of Activity, NEW AM. FOUND., supra note 212. 
262 Weapons, NEW AM. FOUND., supra note 212. Jihadis who had acquired weapons were 
more likely to have obtained them from government informants or agents. Among jihadis who 
had procured weapons, 72% acquired at least some of them on their own, while 90% of non-
jihadis acquired weapons independently. Id. 
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that could have been more effectively spent elsewhere (such as monitoring 
the Tsarnaev brothers prior to their bombing attack in Boston) are being 
squandered on pointless sting operations.263 
If this change in strategy does not result in enough convictions to justify 
current levels of counterterrorism spending, then these funding levels can, 
and should, be reduced when appropriate. Given the small number of genuine 
attacks, significant reductions in terrorism spending might already be 
overdue.264 Some have suggested that the sharp decrease in FBI resources for 
white collar crime and financial fraud kept the FBI from being able to prevent 
the financial meltdown of 2008.265 
F. SUGGESTED DOCTRINAL REFORMS 
The extensive prevalence of the indicators, coupled with the failure so 
far of either the entrapment or outrageous government conduct defense to 
stop a single post-9/11 terrorism conviction, suggests that these doctrines 
have not been effective at preventing or redressing the law enforcement 
abuses they were designed to confront. As emphasized previously, the results 
of this study are not intended to provide reliable proof that entrapment or 
outrageous government conduct has definitely taken place in individual 
cases. Future work should build on these data to make policy suggestions on 
more robust grounds. 
Nonetheless, it seems very likely that some of the most egregious cases 
as suggested by the number of indicators—such as those of James 
Cromitie,266 Sami Hassoun,267 Derrick Shareef,268 and Yassin Aref and 
Mohammed Hossain269—should have been blocked by the courts. Hossain, 
Aref, and Hassoun had no sympathy for jihadi terrorism, and would not have 
 
263 Aziz, supra note 5, at 490; Mike Levine, New Watchdog Report Raises More Questions 
on Whether Boston Bombings Could Have Been Prevented, ABC NEWS (Apr. 10, 2014), http://
abcnews.go.com/Blotter/watchdog-report-raises-questions-boston-bombing-prevented/story?
id=23283597 (reporting that some sources within the FBI believe that the Boston attacks could 
have been prevented if the FBI had responded more appropriately to available information, 
including by more closely investigating the Tsarnaev brothers). 
264 See generally JOHN MUELLER & MARK G. STEWART, TERROR, SECURITY, AND MONEY 
(2011) (concluding, based on risk and cost-benefit analysis, that U.S. counterterrorism 
spending is too high and should be substantially reduced). 
265 William K. Black, Mueller: I Crippled FBI Effort v. White-Collar Crime, My Successor 
Will Make It Worse, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 26, 2013, 12:28 PM), http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/william-k-black/mueller-i-crippled-fbi-ef_b_3817438.html. 
266 See supra text accompanying notes 7–11.  
267 See supra notes 192–195.  
268 See supra text accompanying notes 96-99. 
269 See supra text accompanying notes 180–82. 
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engaged in any terrorism on their own.270 All reasonable observers, including 
the trial court judge, agree that Cromitie would never have engaged in any 
terrorist activity whatsoever if the government informant had not set out to 
persuade him to do so, with promises of large amount of money and repeated 
pestering over a lengthy time period. The threats by Shareef’s informant to 
kill him, or himself, if Shareef did not participate in the plot, should be 
extreme enough inducements to uncontroversially qualify as outrageous 
government conduct.271 
1. Reasonable Suspicion Requirement 
What reforms would most effectively prevent entrapment abuses in 
terrorism prosecutions? As Professor Wadie Said has suggested, the 
authorities could simply cease engaging in sting operations targeting suspects 
for inducement without an “articulable suspicion” that they are already 
planning terrorist activity.272 This could be accomplished either by an internal 
change in policy, or by a new legal requirement, imposed by the courts or by 
Congress, of a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity before deploying 
informants. Former FBI agent Michael German contends that previous 
periods of FBI abuses have been corrected once such policies were 
implemented.273 
Such a change could prevent informants and agents from targeting 
individuals for invalid or questionable reasons. Data on the reasons 
informants initially seek to induce suspects is lacking, in large part due to 
government secrecy. Yet the available information strongly suggests that 
informants often choose targets based on their impressionability, and thus 
their likelihood of being induced, rather than their dangerousness (i.e., the 
likelihood of their actually participating in terrorism). 
If the FBI is going to continue employing informants to induce 
defendants into terrorist offenses, a reasonable suspicion requirement could 
lead the FBI to choose more worthy targets. As it is now, authorities are under 
no compulsion to describe or justify the initial decision to target a defendant 
for inducement. Without even the possibility of close scrutiny of targeting 
decisions, this decisionmaking process may often focus more on generating 
convictions than on protecting the public. A reasonable suspicion 
 
270 See supra notes 192–97 and accompanying text.  
271 See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
272 See Said, supra note 17, at 736 (“The time has almost certainly come to call for not 
merely a curative or more objective version of entrapment doctrine, but rather a halt to the 
policy of using informants to investigate terrorism-related cases where no articulable suspicion 
exists.”). 
273 See German, supra note 2, at 56. 
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requirement, mandating dismissal if the investigation began without it, would 
open the black box of government targeting, preventing government 
informants from going on fishing expeditions by befriending law-abiding 
citizens and attempting to gradually win them over to a terrorist ideology. 
Arguably, if a person is both law-abiding and has no plans to commit a 
crime, and there is no reliable evidence otherwise, the Due Process Clause 
ought to protect such a person from government intrusion designed to induce 
the person to commit a crime. Prevailing conceptions of personal autonomy 
and privacy from unnecessary government intrusion would seem to preclude 
government attempts to manipulate innocents into crime. If courts are 
unwilling to rule in this way, legislatures should enact reasonable suspicion 
requirements.274 
2. Entrapment Doctrine 
Various changes to entrapment doctrine itself could also potentially 
reduce entrapment-type abuses. Jon Sherman has argued in favor of stricter 
requirements on these prosecutions, such as excluding most evidence of a 
defendant’s ideological or religious views, and barring prosecution when the 
informant has radicalized or pressured the defendant.275 These appear to be 
reasonable suggestions, but due to the nebulousness of entrapment doctrine, 
it is difficult to imagine courts grafting the specific rules he proposes onto 
the legal standard. Professor Peter Margulies suggests that employing an 
“objective” entrapment standard, which focuses on the government’s actions 
rather than the defendant’s predisposition, may be more effective than the 
prevailing subjective standard in redressing entrapment in terrorism cases.276 
In contrast, this Article argues in favor of a subjective standard reworked 
to focus on a defendant’s realistic likelihood of committing a similar offense 
on his or her own.277 Such a standard would, much like Judge Richard 
Posner’s version of the entrapment defense in Hollingsworth, require the 
dismissal of a charge if the defendant would have been unlikely to commit 
the same kind of crime on his or her own, without the government’s 
influence.278 Although other courts have not adopted Judge Posner’s 
 
274 Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 557 (1992) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) 
(“Surely the Court cannot intend to impose such a requirement, for it would mean that the 
Government must have a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity before it begins an 
investigation, a condition that we have never before imposed.”). 
275 See Sherman, supra note 17, at 1499–1508. 
276 Peter Margulies, Guantanamo by Other Means: Conspiracy Prosecutions and Law 
Enforcement Dilemmas After September 11, 43 GONZ. L. REV. 513, 556 (2008). 
277 See Dillof, supra note 155, at 894 (advancing a similar argument). 
278 United States v. Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d 1196, 1200 (7th Cir. 1994): 
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approach, the leading academic expert on entrapment, Paul Marcus, argues 
that Hollingsworth represents what the Supreme Court really meant in 
Jacobson.279 This doctrine might be phrased as follows: a case must be 
dismissed on the basis of entrapment if the government induced the defendant 
to commit the crime, and the prosecution cannot prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant was likely to have committed the same type of crime 
without the government inducement.280 
This alternative doctrine has several advantages. It returns the doctrine 
to its roots in realism, as opposed to the circularity, and the undisciplined 
inquiry into the soul, characteristic of current predisposition analysis.281 As 
the doctrine is now, a person such as Cromitie, who talked big (for example, 
making a number of grandiose claims about his past that are known to be 
 
[T]he Court [in Jacobson] clarified the meaning of predisposition. Predisposition is not a purely 
mental state, the state of being willing to swallow the government’s bait. It has positional as well 
as dispositional force. The dictionary definitions of the word include ‘tendency’ as well as 
‘inclination.’ The defendant must be so situated by reason of previous training or experience or 
occupation or acquaintances that it is likely that if the government had not induced him to commit 
the crime some criminal would have done so; only then does a sting or other arranged crime take 
a dangerous person out of circulation. A public official is in a position to take bribes; a drug addict 
to deal drugs; a gun dealer to engage in illegal gun sales. For these and other traditional targets of 
stings all that must be shown to establish predisposition and thus defeat the defense of entrapment 
is willingness to violate the law without extraordinary inducements; ability can be presumed. It is 
different when the defendant is not in a position without the government’s help to become involved 
in illegal activity. The government ‘may not provoke or create a crime, and then punish the 
criminal, its creature.’ Casey v. United States, 276 U.S. 413, 423 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
279 The Entrapment Defense: An Interview with Paul Marcus, 30 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 211, 
220–21 (2004) (arguing that Hollingsworth got the doctrine “exactly right,” and that Jacobson 
clarifies that predisposition asks, “Is [the defendant] likely to have committed the crime 
without the government involvement?”). 
280 It is possible that the standard for inducement should be reformed as well. Currently, 
in many jurisdictions, it requires more than just an opportunity to commit a crime: it must 
involve some pressure as well. See, e.g., United States v. Gendron, 18 F.3d 955, 961 (1st Cir. 
1994); United States v. Andrews, 765 F.2d 1491, 1499 (11th Cir. 1985); MARCUS, supra note 
70, at § 2.03A. But what if the government offers an opportunity to a person to commit a crime 
that is totally beyond the capability of the person, and the person, for whatever reason (perhaps 
mental deficiency or impulsiveness), agrees immediately without the need for any pressure or 
persuasion? In such a case, the entrapment defense would fail, even though the prosecution 
did nothing to promote public safety. Inducement should instead be defined as influencing a 
person in some way to commit a crime. The second prong of the defense (predisposition, or in 
our version, realistic likelihood of committing the crime) is the proper place to consider the 
government’s attempts at pressure or persuasion. Such attempts may often be important, but 
their absence should not always doom an entrapment defense.  
281 T. Ward Frampton, Predisposition and Positivism: The Forgotten Foundations of the 
Entrapment Doctrine, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 111, 146 (2013) (arguing that 
Hollingsworth was true to the positivist origins of the doctrine, because it focused on “the 
actual threat (or lack thereof) posed by the ensnared defendant”). 
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false) but never would have committed any terrorist offense on his own, can 
forfeit the entrapment defense because his pro-terrorist talk qualifies, 
however improbable it may sound, as “an already-formed design.”282 
Cromitie’s codefendants, even the low-functioning mentally ill one, were 
also unable to successfully assert the entrapment defense—even though they 
realistically would have never engaged in any terrorism offense—because of 
their lack of hesitation.283 A “ready response” to a criminal opportunity and 
a lack of reluctance are central factors in current entrapment analyses.284 In a 
doctrine based on realistic likelihood of committing a similar offense, these 
might be factors in some analyses, but there is no reason they should be 
dispositive. 
Such a doctrine could also put an end to the tendency for courts to allow 
juries to rely on the defendant’s sympathy for terrorists alone to justify a 
finding of predisposition beyond a reasonable doubt. Since the vast majority 
of people with pro-terrorist views never commit an attack, it seems 
impossible for a reasonable factfinder to conclude that a defendant would 
have been likely to commit a similar offense beyond a reasonable doubt 
simply because of his or her views. With predisposition analysis, it is much 
easier for that absurd result to happen, because the abstract concept of 
predisposition has been stretched beyond its pragmatic roots.285 Due to the 
confusion engendered by courts’ interpretation of the term predisposition, it 
is better to drop that word from the doctrine altogether, replacing it with 
unambiguous language. 
One reason that a subjective defense is preferable to an objective 
defense is that courts might apply an objective test too conservatively, 
blocking only cases which approach the unreasonably high “shocks the 
conscience” standard used for the outrageous government conduct defense.286 
In addition, if a person was likely to have committed a similar crime anyway, 
then logically, even overreaching government behavior should not mandate 
the dismissal of the case. It would be a pity if an objective entrapment defense 
resulted in truly dangerous defendants going free simply because the 
informant engaged in a particular behavior.287 
 
282 United States v. Cromitie, 727 F.3d 194, 212 (2d Cir. 2013). 
283 Id. at 216. 
284 See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
285 See supra note 281 and accompanying text.  
286 See supra note 40 and accompanying text.  
287 United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 434 (1973) (“Nor does it seem particularly 
desirable for the law to grant complete immunity from prosecution to one who himself planned 
to commit a crime, and then committed it, simply because government undercover agents 
subjected him to inducements which might have seduced a hypothetical individual who was 
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Another advantage of the reformed version of the subjective defense 
proposed here is that “objective” considerations of the nature of the 
government conduct (“the nature of the inducement or persuasion by the 
government”) can still be factored into the analysis, as is now the case in a 
commonly applied five-factor predisposition analysis.288 If an informant went 
to extraordinary lengths to persuade a defendant, this casts doubt on the 
defendant’s propensity to carry out a similar crime on his or her own.289 In 
effect, this lets in objective considerations through the back door, resulting in 
a subjective–objective blend that better accommodates the real-world variety 
in factual situations.290 
 
not so predisposed.”). Such scenarios are admittedly unlikely to occur, since extreme attempts 
at pressuring a defendant into a crime should be unnecessary if the defendant was likely to 
commit such crimes on his or her own. Interview with Paul Marcus, supra note 279, at 220. 
288 United States v. Hall, 608 F.3d 340, 343 (7th Cir. 2010); see supra note 44 and 
accompanying text.  
289 Interview with Paul Marcus, supra note 279, at 220: 
Now it seems to me the Supreme Court here has done a pretty good job because the 
Justices have retained the majority subjective test so predisposition is still the test. But 
what they have said is: We are going to look carefully at two things. First, what is 
predisposition? Just because a person has a predilection for this type of activity does 
not mean a predisposition. The real question is: Whether he would have engaged in the 
criminal behavior, which is different. And second, we are going to rely much more 
heavily on an analysis of the government’s behavior. If the government engaged in 
extensive and intensive inducement, that is a good sign that the defendant was not 
predisposed because it took such extreme inducement in order to get him to commit the 
crime. So, in a way, even though the Court still retains the predisposition test, it looks 
more like a blend because we are putting more reliance on the government behavior 
than we ever did before. 
290 Id. Even so, a significant drawback of a subjective entrapment defense, and a good 
argument for an objective one, is the tendency for judges and juries, like all people, to be 
influenced by the fundamental attribution error to ascribe people’s behavior to their character 
even when circumstances are the deciding factor. This is related to the circularity problem—
the conclusion that if a defendant was persuaded to go through with a crime, he must have 
been predisposed. Doing away with the word predisposition might help somewhat, as 
recommended above. But restrictions on evidence—for example, disallowing factfinders from 
basing decisions solely on behavior that occurred after the government contact—may 
ultimately be needed to limit the circular reasoning inherent in subjective approaches. If courts 
refuse to impose any such restrictions, an objective test, or a subjective–objective hybrid, 
might be most effective in reducing entrapment abuses. Alternatively, to supplement the 
subjective entrapment defense, the outrageous government conduct defense could be 
potentially merged with the objective entrapment defense to create a less imposing-sounding 
“improper government conduct” defense, encompassing a wider variety of problematic 
government behavior than either doctrine. 
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3. Reflections 
Despite the potential of such reforms, doctrinal changes may well prove 
ineffective in prompting courts or juries to police entrapment and outrageous 
government conduct more vigorously. Juries and judges alike are so reluctant 
to employ these defenses, and terrorism prosecutions are so fraught with 
primal fear, that we cannot necessarily expect factfinders to apply the 
doctrines in appropriate cases, regardless of the specific content of the 
doctrines. As mentioned earlier, the jury in the Hayat case reportedly 
believed he was entrapped and thus innocent of all charges, but felt compelled 
to convict because of the seriousness of the terrorism charges.291 For this 
reason, persuading or requiring law enforcement agencies to change their 
counterterrorism practices might be the only effective strategy for preventing 
entrapment. 
Yet in response to calls for change, the government would probably 
argue that its current tactics, focused on targeting law-abiding citizens for 
inducement, are necessary to prevent “lone wolf” attacks.292 While this may 
seem difficult to accept on the grounds of common sense alone, the belief is 
strongly held and requires serious engagement to debunk. 
Despite the appeal of these proposals for legal and policy reform, the 
likelihood of their adoption in the current legal and political climate is close 
to nil. What is needed most of all, in order to stimulate effective reform, is 
research that convincingly demonstrates—if this is indeed correct—that the 
FBI’s focus on inducing law-abiding individuals into terrorist schemes is 
unnecessary, and perhaps even harmful, for our national security.293 
Generating such research should be a most urgent task in any strategy for 
eliminating the abuses that appear to be commonplace in terrorism 
prosecutions. 
CONCLUSION 
Several journalists and scholars have explored the issue of entrapment 
in terrorism prosecutions, but these accounts have tended to be based on a 
small number of cases. Estimating the prevalence of entrapment in terrorism 
cases is important for assessing the effectiveness and ethics of the 
 
291 See supra notes 74–77 and accompanying text.  
292 AARONSON, supra note 19, at 26–27, 30. It is also possible that some see such 
convictions as necessary to promote general deterrence against would-be terrorists, even if the 
individuals would have been unlikely to themselves engage in terrorism. See supra note 154 
and accompanying text. 
293 See generally Norris, supra note 78. 
2. NORRIS FINAL FOR PRINTER (CORRECTED OCT. 11) 10/11/2016  9:14 AM 
2015] ESTIMATING THE PREVALENCE OF ENTRAPMENT 673 
government’s counterterrorism strategy, and for formulating appropriate 
policy responses. 
This Article attempted to fill this need first by constructing a database 
of post-9/11 terrorism cases, and second by determining the presence of 
twenty potential entrapment indicators in each of the cases involving an 
informant or undercover government agent. The Article finds that among 580 
post-9/11 terrorism prosecutions, 55% involved an informant or undercover 
agent in some capacity before the crime was committed. Particularly with 
regard to jihadi and left-wing defendants, the average case involving 
informants has numerous indicators of possible entrapment or outrageous 
government conduct. The more serious cases, involving plots to commit 
specific terrorist attacks, tend to have even more entrapment indicators. 
These results strongly suggest that relatively egregious informant practices 
are not confined to a small number of cases, but are rather widespread, 
accounting for a significant proportion of cases. 
Even so, the results of this study should be interpreted with caution, 
since lack of information on many cases may understate the prevalence of 
many indicators, false or exaggerated allegations by defendants may 
overstate the prevalence of indicators in some cases, and the number of 
indicators may not always correspond closely with the strength of the 
entrapment or outrageous government conduct defense. 
We also examined the claim by a journalist that only 1% of terrorism 
convictions represent “real” threats to national security—i.e., genuine plots 
connected to international terrorism that were thwarted by authorities.294 
Based on a review of the informant and noninformant cases, we conclude that 
the total number of cases appearing to have been genuine threats is higher, 
but still rather low, representing about 9% of all jihadi defendants and 5% of 
jihadi defendants in cases involving informants. The remaining jihadi cases 
either involved less serious crimes, such as attempts to send money to 
terrorists or to join them overseas, or plots that would have never existed 
without the informant’s involvement.295 
Given these results, and the evidence that right-wing extremists are 
responsible for more violence than jihadis, the Article contends that 
policymakers should reconsider the government’s focus on sting operations 
targeted at Muslims with no history of ties to terrorism. Instead, the 
government should redirect its counterterrorism efforts towards passive 
 
294 See Holland, supra note 20. 
295 Previous research also supports the idea that the majority of terrorism convictions are 
for relatively minor crimes. Laguardia, supra note 12, at 190 (“I identified 585 individuals 
prosecuted and sentenced in association with terrorism by January 2011. Of those 585, only 
66 had been sentenced to 15 years or longer.”). 
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surveillance, while investing more resources in the prevention of right-wing 
terrorism. A focus on (legal methods of) passive surveillance, rather than 
actively encouraging the creation of plots, is likely to be a more effective 
strategy for preventing terrorist attacks, since it would avoid wasting time 
and money on cases in which defendants would have never engaged in 
terrorism on their own. This would allow authorities to concentrate on those 
few cases in which pro-terrorism sympathies begin inspiring concrete plans. 
 Finally, the Article briefly argues in favor of a reasonable suspicion 
requirement before inducing an individual to commit a crime, and reformed 
entrapment defense based on a defendant’s realistic likelihood of committing 
a similar offense without government prompting. Even so, such policy or 
doctrinal shifts may be relatively ineffective, compared with the preferable 
step of simply stopping law enforcement from targeting law-abiding Muslims 
and others for inducement by aggressive informants. 
Yet such changes have little chance of occurring, given authorities’ 
strongly held belief in their strategy of preemptive prosecution. For this 
reason, it is particularly important for scholars to investigate the validity of 
the government’s stated justifications for preemptive prosecutions—for 
example, the assertion that these defendants would have eventually 
committed real terror attacks (which could not have been prevented by 
surveillance) if they had not been ensnared in fake plots. While the facts of 
many of these cases suggest that this justification is dubious, a more detailed 
analysis is necessary to allow definitive judgments on the matter. 
Beyond this, future research should investigate in more detail the larger 
field of informant-led terrorism prosecutions, including by examining with 
more precision the differences between the jihadi cases and other cases. Such 
research might lend further support to this Article’s argument that authorities 
should shift counterterrorism research toward right-wing extremists, and 
further corroborate critics’ suspicions that the government is 
disproportionately targeting Muslims, and left-wing activists as well. 
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APPENDIX A: CODING CRITERIA FOR ENTRAPMENT INDICATORS 
Indicator Coded “Yes” if source information indicates or alleges: 
No previous 
offenses  
Defendant had not been charged with a terrorism offense 
before being contacted by the informant or agent, and 
Defendant had not already committed, or was not already 
engaged in or planning, a terrorist offense before being approached 
by an informant or agent. 
Government 
proposed the crime 
The informant or agent proposed to the defendant the idea of 




The informant or agent pressured the defendant to engage in 
the offense, repeatedly asked the defendant to participate, or sought 
to persuade him or her either that terrorism is justified or to 
participate in the particular offense.  
Material incentive The informant or agent offered a financial or other material 
incentive for committing the offense. 
Defendant’s 
reluctance 
The defendant at some point expressed reluctance to commit 
the offense, either verbally or through actions, such as a failure to 
cooperate with plans or to follow up on communications with the 
informant. 
Governmental 
control of the crime 
The informant or agent controlled to a large degree the 
circumstances of the crime, beyond simply providing the means. 
This could include, for example, involvement in planning the 
details of the crime, arranging for meetings with additional 
informants or agents, or providing the buyer as well as the seller (in 
a sting operation for a trafficking offense). 
Government 
provided the means 
The informant or agent provided the defendant with the 
resources, knowledge, or social connections needed to carry out an 
offense, such as funds to travel, weapons, or a vehicle for 
transporting a bomb. 
Government spoon-
feeding 
The informant or agent provided the defendant with detailed 
assistance in carrying out the actions associated with the planning 
or execution of the offense.  
Defendant’s 
financial motivation 
The defendant was motivated to a large extent by the 




The informant was paid for his or her services, or received 
favorable treatment in criminal or administrative matters. 
2. NORRIS FINAL FOR PRINTER (CORRECTED OCT. 11) 10/11/2016  9:14 AM 
676 NORRIS & GROL-PROKOPCZYK [Vol. 105 
Informant’s 
characteristics 
The informant or agent: 
 was known for manipulating others, 
 was considered charismatic, 
 had been convicted of crimes involving dishonesty 
(such as fraud), 
 had been found to be lying to government officials 
or others, 
 had engaged in questionable tactics in previous 
operations, 
 had an extensive criminal record, 
 was suspected of continuing to commit crimes 
while serving as an informant, 
 had a serious mental illness, and/or 
 was considered unreliable by the informant’s 




The informant or agent provided the defendant with a job, 
housing or a temporary place to stay, or money for housing-related 
expenses. 
Informant use or 
provision of alcohol 
or drugs 
The informant or agent:  
 provided the defendant, whether as a gift or 
through a transaction, with alcohol or recreational 
drugs, 
 used alcohol or drugs with the defendant, while 
discussing the offense, and/or  
 encouraged the defendant to use alcohol or drugs. 
Suspect evidentiary 
practices 
The informant or agent sought to elicit statements or prompt 
actions primarily for the purpose of obtaining predisposition 
evidence to be used at trial, or failed to record conversations 
important for ascertaining whether the defendant was entrapped. 
Defendant targeted 
for invalid reason 
A primary reason the suspect was targeted for inducement by 
authorities was invalid (for example, if the person was targeted due 
to a mistaken identity or false information). 
Defendant targeted 
for speech 
The informant or agent targeted the defendant for inducement 
primarily because of the speech the defendant legally engaged in 
(such as expressing sympathy for terrorism). 
Defendant targeted 
despite lack of 
terrorist sympathies 
Defendant was not ideologically supportive of terrorism at 
the time the defendant was first approached by an informant or 
agent. 
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Mental illness Defendant: 
 was diagnosed with or being treated for a mental 
disorder, 
 was regarded as or suspected of having a mental 
illness, and/or 
 engaged in behaviors or experienced symptoms 
(such as hallucinations) which likely indicate 
mental illness. 
Youth Defendant was 24 years old or younger at the time of his or 
her first contact with the informant or agent. 
Underachiever 
profile 
Defendant exhibited two or more of the following 
characteristics or behaviors: 
 having few social contacts or friends, 
 spending nearly all of the day alone in front of a 
computer, 
 having no job or a low-paying job, 
 showing little personal initiative in seeking out 
social or employment opportunities, or 
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